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I. SCOPE OF DISCUSSION'
Ideally, public participation in rule-making leads to better
rules. Rules, which enhance the effectiveness of the demo-
cratic process and further the pursuit of ends, which have
received the imprimatur of the democratic processes, serve
the needs of society. Failure to involve the public obviously
dilutes or vitiates democracy in crucial ways. Traditional
administrative public hearings unfortunately tend to re-
strict rather than encourage participation. When an agency
ignores multi-cultural differences, an agency's determina-
tions of what is in an affected community's interests will
look, or be, both bureaucratic and inaccurate.
Lack of effective public participation in the administrative
public hearing rule-making process is most clearly illus-
trated in the context of environmental rule-making. The
concept of "environmental justice," which is defined by EPA
as "the fair treatment of people of all races, income and
education levels and cultures, with respect to the develop-
ment, implementation and enforcement of this country's
1. In the fall of 1996, I moderated a United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) public hearing affecting a neighborhood in south Dallas, Texas. EPA
organized the meeting to allow the public to comment on a rule under considera-
tion by EPA that would affect the community and its residents. The community's
demographic make-up was typical of south Dallas: a predominate mix of African-
Americans and Latinos, with some Asian-Americans and a few Anglo-Americans.
Most of the participants were of low to moderate income.
I facilitated the public hearing process. EPA officials were uncomfortable with
the sometimes emotional verbal styles of the south Dallas residents. Community
leaders could feel resistance from those officials. The typical public hearing format
EPA expected was entirely inadequate if any meaningful communication were to
occur. Moreover, the format of the hearing ignored the emotional needs of the
speakers. In previous hearings, as community members became aware of the
agency's and facilitator's lack of appreciation for each speaker's emotional inter-
ests, tempers rose and communication began to break down.
In response, I adopted a non-traditional approach to the typical administrative
hearing. The community was given full opportunity to make its side known to
EPA before the administration's presentation of facts. Each community speaker
was given full reign over the length and subject matter of his or her comments,
regardless of the perceived relevance of those comments by EPA. Above all, I suc-
cessfully encouraged EPA officials to listen compassionately to the problems of
community members.
Although issues remained to be resolved, the process enhanced communica-
tion. Had the hearing continued without the benefit of.someone with cultural ties
to both sides, it would probably have resulted in yet another contentious and un-
productive battle between EPA officials and community leaders and participants.
Ultimately, as is often the case, the hearing would have done more harm than
good.
172 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 24:169
environmental laws, regulations and policies,"2 has become
a major part of the overall concept of social justice. Recog-
nition of the unequal distribution of the costs and benefits
associated with environmental regulations has brought the
notions of "environmental justice," "environmental equity,"
and "environmental racism,"3 into the arena of public de-
bate, attracting the attention of social activists, community
and political leaders, and governmental officials. Conse-
quently, in recent years, leading federal and state agencies
have been given the mandate of defining, investigating and
evaluating the mechanisms of infringements of environ-
mental rights in different communities. With regard to mi-
nority communities, these agencies have been charged with
the task of establishing and maintaining environmental eq-
uity. This mandate has been partially fulfilled through
changes and additions to traditional rule-making proce-
dures under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")."
Unfortunately, multi-cultural differences frequently frus-
trate the purpose of public participation in the administra-
tive hearing process. ' This article will discuss the hearing
process of administrative rule-making, and ways that agen-
cies can accommodate multi-cultural differences so as to
improve both access to participation and the efficacy of that
participation. Specifically, this paper will discuss the envi-
ronmental justice movement and attempts to expand public
participation in an effort to achieve more just responsive
2. ENVIRONMENT WEEK, December 9, 1993. See also Carita Shanklin, Pathfinder:
Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 333 (1997) ("[iln broad terms, environ-
mental justice requires that environmental enforcement, compliance, policy for-
mulation, and decision making be addressed through a participatory, democratic
process.")
3. These three terms seem to be used interchangeably to describe inequities in
environmental regulation and impact on minorities. Id. Use of the term environ-
mental racism focuses on the claim that the burden of the use of environmentally
polluting facilities falls most heavily on low-income or minority groups. Roliff Pur-
rington & Michael Wynne, Environmental Racism: Is a Nascent Social Science Con-
cept a Sound Basis for Legal Relie?, 35 APR Hous. LAw. 34 (1998). Some govern-
ment reports use the phrase environmental equity "because it most readily lends
itself to scientific risk analysis." Id. See also Office of Policy, Planning and
Evaluation, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Environmental Equity: Reducing Risk
of All Communities 2 (1992). "Environmental justice" seems to be the term used
most frequently today by the government and by scholars. Purrington & Wynne,
supra.
4. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
5. Shanklin, supra note 2.
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outcomes for every community.
Part II of this article places participation problems in
context by looking at specific issues of environmental equity
in the rule-making process. Part III examines the need to
expand public participation as a desirable goal, discusses
obstacles minorities face in participating in the rule-making
process due to cultural differences and other barriers to
participation, and applies the Administrative Procedure Act
to the goals of participation. Part IV addresses some theo-
retical and practical concerns of the efforts by EPA to ex-
pand public participation. Part V offers some possible
means by which minorities may be included in the process
more effectively.
II. PARTICIPATION PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS IN
CONTEXT: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
Both administrative officials and public participants have
an interest in working together to change the current sys-
tem to allow enhanced multi-cultural public participation in
the administrative decision-making process. The environ-
mental justice movement best exemplifies this need. As
various organizations unite to fight for the end of environ-
mental racism,' public input into the decision-making proc-
ess of EPA has become imperative.' Responses to the slow
and cumbersome notice-and-comment rulemaking proce-
dures under the APA have produced a variety of new mod-
els for public participation, which purport to expand par-
ticipation, communication and dialogue between interested
parties.8 EPA has been among the most willing to experi-
ment with the new models of rule-making.9 Although this
willingness to implement these new models has been both
appropriate and necessary for EPA, 10 successful inclusion
6. See Carolyn Graham & Jennifer B. Grills, Comment, Environmental Justice: A
Survey of Federal and State Responses. 8 ViI. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 241 (1997).
7. See John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advi-
sory Boards in Environmental Declslonmaklng, 73 IND. L.J. 901 (1998).
8. Siobhan Mee, Negotiated Rulemaking and Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOS):
Consensus Saves Ossykxaion?, 25 B.C. ENVrLAFF. L. REV. 213, 215 (1997); Apple-
gate, supra note 7. at 915.
9. Among the first agencies to experiment with regulatory negotiations in the
mld-1980s were EPA. the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Occupational
Safety & Health Administration. Mee, supra note 8, at 216.
10. Professor Applegate, who discusses basic and enhanced review-and-
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requires addressing the inherent differences among its par-
ticipants.
A. Brief Overview of the Environmental Justice Movement
Although public attention to socio-environmental issues
began in the mid-1960s, a strong national movement to
bring the environmental problems facing disadvantaged
communities to public attention did not occur until the
early 1980s." During the early 1980s, several environ-
mental and grass roots community action groups brought
the environmental problems facing disadvantaged commu-
nities to national attention.1 2 For example, demonstrations
by members of a low-income, predominately black commu-
nity in Warren County, North Carolina, against a proposed
site for a polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) landfill garnered
national media coverage in 1982.13 A study by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) in 1983 showed that 75 percent of
hazardous waste disposal sites in the southern United
States are located in minority (primarily African-American)
communities. 4 The legacy of racial inequities in other parts
of society assists in making poorer communities targets for
waste sites, incinerators and other such facilities. The long
comment rulemaking, regulatory negotiation, and citizens advisory boards, notes
none of these models of participation are the exclusive rule-making procedures of
any given agency. While EPA often utilizes regulatory negotiation, it is not limited
by this model. Applegate, supra note 7, at 951.
11. Robert D. Bullard, Race and Environmental Justice in the United States, 18
YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 327 (1990). The environmental justice movement emerged at
the same time national attention was increasingly focused on racial discrimination
and civil rights. It went essentially unnoticed until the early 1980s, when main-
stream civil rights groups began to bring the problem to the forefront. Id. at 328.
See also Graham & Grills, supra note 6, at 239.
12. Bullard, supra note 11, at 329.
13. United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, Proceedings of the
First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit C. Lee, Ed. (1992).
Among the civil rights groups protesting were the United Church of Christ Com-
mission for Racial Justice, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and the
Congressional Black Caucus. Bullard, supra note 11, at 328. A protest march
involving local residents, religious leaders, civil rights groups and government offi-
cials resulted in 500 arrests. Linda D. Blank, Comment, Seeking Solutions to En-
vironmental Equity: The Environmental Justice Act, 24 ENVTL L. 1109, 1113 (1994).
These protests "became a watershed in the movement to link environmental issues
with social justice." William K. Reilly, Environmental Equity: EPA's Position, 18
EPA JouRNAL 18, 19 (Mar/Apr. 1992). See also Graham & Grills, supra note 6, at
239.
14. General Accounting Office Report, 1983 WL 645374 (1983).
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history of housing segregation and discrimination in the
United States limited minority choices in developing neigh-
borhoods. Poverty and lack of upward mobility made it dif-
ficult for people to escape polluted areas.
The environmental justice debate continued throughout
the 1980s, with several studies finding a disproportion in
hazardous waste site locations between minority and non-
minority communities.' 5 In 1992, Paul Mohai and Bunyon
Bryant conducted a detailed analysis of race and income as
predictors for environmental damage.' 6  Using data con-
ceming the distribution of commercial hazardous waste fa-
cilities in the Detroit area, Mohai and Bryant examined the
relative strength of the relationship of race and income on
the distribution of commercial hazardous waste facilities
using multiple linear regression analysis. ' In addition to
their own analysis, Mohai and Bryant also reviewed fifteen
other studies. They concluded that there was "clear and
unequivocal evidence that income and racial biases in the
distribution of environmental hazards exists" and that race
is more importantly related to the distribution than is in-
come.' 8 In the same year, a National Law Journal study
found that environmental laws, including statutes that set
standards for air, water and waste disposal, were not en-
forced equally among communities." There was a pattem
of differences between action at Superfund sites in white
versus minority areas. Based on an eight-month analysis
of census data and EPA files and records at nearly 1,200
Superfund sites, the study found that fines and penalties
under all environmental laws, especially at hazardous
waste sites, were higher in white areas than non-white ar-
15. See Graham & Grills, supra note 6, at 240 (citing Blank, supra note 13, at
1113; Audrey Wright, Note, Unequal Protection Under the Environmental Laws: Re-
viewing the Evidence on Environmental Ractsm and the Inequities on Environmental
Legislation, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1725, 1729 (1993); Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant,
Environmental Justice: Weighing Race and Class as Factors in the Distribution of
EnvironmentalHazards. 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 921, 922 (1992)).
16. Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evi-
dence, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR
DISCOURSE, 173-174 (Mohai & Bryant, eds., 1990).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Marianne Lavell & Marcial Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in
Environmental Law, NArL L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2.
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eas. 20 This investigation further found this imbalance often
occurs whether the community is wealthy or poor.2 The
pattern of penalties assessed against polluters varied de-
pending upon the actual law broken; surprisingly, commu-
nity income was not a reliable predictor.' Race, however,
was linked to the amounts of fines levied.
The identification of environmental inequities has not
been the sole province of environmental activists. EPA it-
self, through the formation of an Environmental Equity
Workgroup, has studied the correlation between race, in-
come and environmental risks.' EPA also established the
Office of Environmental Equity in 1992 to deal with issues
of environmental equity and justice. The Office is responsi-
ble for the communication, outreach, education, and
training of the public on the issues of environmental equity;
the technical and financial assistance to outside groups on
equity concerns; and serves as a central repository of in-
formation on matters related to environmental equity.24
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The Minorities Equation, NAVL L.J., Sept. 21, 1993, at S2.
23. The Environmental Equity Workgroup, made up of staff from various offices
and regions, was given four tasks: (1) Review and evaluate the evidence that racial
minority and low-income people bear a disproportionate burden; (2) Review cur-
rent EPA programs to identify factors that might give rise to differential risk re-
duction, and develop approaches to correct such problems; (3) Review EPA risk
assessment and risk communication guidelines with respect to race and income
related risks; (4) Review institutional relationships, including outreach to and
consultation with racial minority and low-income organizations, to assure that
EPA is fulfilling its mission with respect to these populations. The workgroup
published its conclusions in 1992. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Office of Planning and Evaluation, Environmental Equity, Reducing the Risk for All
Communities (1992).
24. The legislative activities that resulted in the introduction of the Environ-
mental Justice Act, and the recommendation of the Workgroup that authored
"Environmental Equity: Reducing the Risk for All Communities" (EPA, 1992) led
EPA to establish the Office of Civil Rights in 1992. In October 1993, this office
opened investigations into two cases in Iberville Parish, Louisiana and Noxubee
County, Mississippi based on possible Title VI violations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1988) (Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex or color in pro-
grams receiving federal funds). An internal memorandum issued on September 3,
1993, in the Justice Department advised the section chiefs that environmental law
enforcement in minority communities will receive increasing attention. The cases
with underlying environmental Justice issues can be filed under both Title VI and
Section 1983 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. EPA Office of Civil Rights referred the
two cases in Iberville Parish and Noxubee County to the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice to be processed under Title VI or Section 1983. This title may apply in cases
involving pollution and siting of industrial and waste processing facilities. Ele-
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The environmental justice movement has also received
some federal governmental response. Legislative efforts
have included the Environmental Justice Acts of 199226 and
1993,27 The Department of the Environment Act of 1993, 28
The Environmental Equal Rights Act of 1993,29 and The En-
vironmental Health Equity Information Act of 1993.30 Of
particular interest among these efforts was a provision in
the Environmental Equal Rights Act which would have al-
lowed "any citizen residing in a state in which a new facility
for the management of solid or hazardous waste is proposed
to be constructed in an environmentally disadvantaged
community" to petition in protest the scheduled construc-
tion of the waste facilities."' Unfortunately, Congress has
enacted neither this nor any other similar proposal.32
Executive response to environmental justice has been
more favorable. In 1993, President Clinton directly charged
EPA with eliminating environmental discrimination. In
President Clinton's Executive Order No. 12845, issued in
1993:
ments of a cause of action under Title VI must show that an agency involved in
permitting of these facilities is engaging in racial or national origin discrimination
and that it is receiving federal funding. 42 U.S.C A §2000d, note 9 (West 1988).
The requirement is to show discriminatory consideration in siting a new facility in
a given community, and not necessarily intent as is required under other civil
rights law. 42 U.S.C-A. § 2000d, note 9 (West 1988) (citing Jackson v. Conway,
486 F. Supp. 896 (D.C. Mo. 1979)).
25. As discussed below, the House and Senate have introduced several bills
since 1992 to protect the environment and endangered communities. However,
none of these bills were passed, nor has any legislation specifically addressing en-
vironmental justice been enacted. See Clarice E. Gaylord & Geraldine W. Twitty,
Protecting Endangered Communities, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 780 (1994); Gra-
ham & Grills, supra note 6, at 242.
26. S. 2806, 102d Cong. (1992): H.R. 5326, 102d Cong. (1992). This bill re-
quired a moratorium on the siting of facilities which would impose additional envi-
ronmental risks in predetermined high-risk areas. Graham & Grills, supra note 6,
at 242-43. See also Richard J. Lazarus, The Meaning and Promotion of Environ-
mental Justice, 5 MD. J. CoNJEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 1, 7 (1993/1994).
27. S. 1161, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993).
28. S. Rep. No. 103-38, at 1 (1993). This bill proposed the elevation of EPA ad-
ministrator to Cabinet-level status, enabling EPA to respond to environmental
concerns with more authority. Id. See also Graham & Grills. supra note 6, at 243;
Gaylord & Twitty, supra note 25, at 780.
29. H.R. Rep. No. 103-1924 (1993).
30. H.R. Rep. No. 103-1925 (1993).
31. H.R. Rep. No. 103-1924 (1993). See also Gaylord & Twitty, supra note 25.
at 782; Graham & Grills, supra note 6. at 244.
32. Gaylord & Twitty, supra note 25, at 780.
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[He] asked the Environmental Protection Agency and the De-
partment of Justice to begin an inter-agency review of federal,
state and local regulations and enforcement that affect com-
munities of color and low income communities with the goal
of formulating an aggressive investigation of the inequalities
in exposure to environmental hazards. As part of this
evaluation, the Department of Justice and the Environmental
Protection Agency- in coordination with the Department of
Housing and Urban Development and the Department of La-
bor- will identify examples of communities in which the dis-
tributional inequalities of environmental decision making
have adversely affected minority and low income populations.
This process will be the basis for legislative and enforcement
reforms if necessary.33
One year later, President Clinton issued perhaps the
strongest decree in the fight for environmental justice in
Executive Order 12898. 31 Its purpose is to ensure "that
management of federal facilities, establishment of federal
policies, and the implementation of federal actions promote
fair and proportionate environmental protection for all," and
directs all federal agencies to "make achieving environ-
mental justice part of their missions."35 This Executive Or-
der has significantly impacted the direction of the activities
of federal and state administrative agencies. Federal agen-
cies are required to encourage public participation, and to
provide access to all information pursuant to the Right-to-
Know Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Sun-
shine Act.3 Federal agencies are also directed to develop
agency strategies to prevent "disproportionate environ-
mental equities," and collect and analyze human health and
environmental information that relates to environmental
justice issues.
33. Exec. Order No. 12,845, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,887 (1993).
34. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (1994).
35. Id. at 1-101.
36. See Applegate, supra note 7.
37. See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Resource Conservation
Recovery Act Public Participain Manual, Sept. 1996 at 1-101 [hereinafter RCRA
Manua/]
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B. A Response to the Fight for Environmental Justice:
Expand Public Participation
EPA reacted rather quickly to Executive Order 12898.38
EPA's Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
(OSWER) continued to address environmental justice con-
cerns beyond those related to public participation.39 The
Assistant Administrator of OSWER, Elliott P. Laws, formed
the OSWER Environmental Justice Task Force ("EJ Task
Force").4 EPA released the EJ Task Force's Draft Final Re-
port4' and a separate executive summary42 on April 25,
1994. The release of this report and subsequent meas-
ures43 have represented "OSWER's commitment to adhere to
the principles of Executive Order 12898."' Moreover, EPA
issued a policy directive in September 1994, requiring all
future OSWER policy and guidance documents to consider
environmental justice issues.45
The Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), 4 a
38. Supra note 34. President Clinton issued this order on February 11, 1994.
39. See RCRA Expanded Public Participation Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 63417-34,
63418 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 124 et seq.) [hereinafter RCRA Rule].
40. Id.
41. OSWER Environmental Justice Task Force Draft Final Report, OSWER
9200.3-16 (April 25, 1994) (Draft).
42. OSWER 9200.3-16-1 (April 25, 1994) (Draft).
43. EPA noted the following when it published the RCRA Expanded Public Par-
ticipation Rule in 1995: "Since [April 19941, EPA Regional offices and the OSWER
program offices have been implementing the recommendations outlined in the EJ
Task Force's draft final report. The report was distributed to the National Envi-
ronmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC) for comment. In June 1995, after
careful consideration of all comments, EPA released the 'OSWER Environmental
Justice Action Agenda.' The Action Agenda provides a concise summary of
OSWER's current strategy and describes the implementation process for ensuring
that major issues, identified by the NEJAC and others, continue to be recognized
and addressed. A full report on implementation progress and accomplishments,
entitled Waste Programs Environmental Justice Accomplishment Report,' was re-
leased concurrently with the Action Agenda. All of these documents are 'living
documents' and, as such, are a part of the process of continuously addressing en-
vironmental justice concerns." RCRA Rule, supra note 39, at 63421.
44. Id.
45. OSWER 98200.3-17; See also RCRA Manual, supra note 37, at 2-19: RCRA
Rule, supra note 39, at 63.421.
46. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. 94-580,
90 Stat. 2795 (1976). RCRA is among a number of amendments to the Solid
Waste Disposal Act, including a significant amendment, the Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA), Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984). which
expanded the scope of RCRA. See RCRA Manual, supra note 37, at 1-4.
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1976 amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act,47 gives
EPA the authority to promulgate regulations to govern haz-
ardous waste management facility permit procedures. 4"
Congress granted EPA broad authority to provide for public
participation in the permitting process.49 The RCRA re-
quires EPA to provide for, encourage and assist public par-
ticipation in the development, revision, implementation and
enforcement of any regulation, guideline, information or
program under the Act. 5° The Act requires the administra-
tor to advertise the agency's intention to issue a permit via
public notice in newspapers and radio,5' as well as letters to
local governments and state agencies. 52 The Act also pro-
vides for a process by which the public may oppose the
granting of a permit.53
Despite the mandated encouragement and expansion of
public participation in the RCRA, concerns remained about
the process.5' Stakeholders expressed dissatisfaction that
the RCRA permitting process did not involve the public
during the early stages of the process, did not provide ade-
quate information to the public, and did not provide an eq-
47. Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (1994).
48. See id.
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b)(1). See also RCRA Rule, supra note 39, at 63418; RCRA
Manual. supra note 37, at 1-6; Pub. L. 94-580 § 7004(b).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b)(2)(A).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b)(2)(B).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b)(2) ("If within 45 days the Administrator receives written
notice of opposition to the agency's intention to issue such permit and a request
for a hearing, or if the Administrator determines on his own initiative, he shall
hold an informal public hearing (including an opportunity for presentation of
written and oral views) on whether he should issue a permit for the proposed fa-
cility. Whenever possible the Administrator shall schedule such hearing at a lo-
cation convenient to the nearest population center to such proposed facility and
give notice in the aforementioned manner of the date, time, and subject matter of
such hearing. No State program which provides for the issuance of permits re-
ferred to in this paragraph may be authorized by the Administrator under section
6926 of this title unless such program provides for the notice and hearing re-
quired by the paragraph.")
54. See Applegate, supra note 7. at 906-926. Basic Review-and-Comment is the
traditional form of rulemaking under the APA. Enhanced review-and-comment is
an expanded, more pluralistic model of the basic review-and-comment. See Id. at
909. Given the mandate of public participation in RCRA, it seems clear the model
considered is something more than the "bare minima" review-and-comment found
in traditional rulemaking procedures. See Id. However, as discussed here, the
concerns of traditional rulemaking were raised with respect to the RCRA rule-
making procedures.
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uitable opportunity to participate in the process." With a
policy directive requiring consideration of environmental
justice issues,56 EPA in 1995 promulgated the RCRA Ex-
panded Public Participation Rule57 to create more opportu-
nity for public involvement in the permitting process and
increased access to permitting information.8 Prospective
applicants for waste handling permits are required under
the rule to hold an informal meeting before submitting the
application for the permit.5 " The regulations require an ap-
plicant to advertise the meeting in newspapers, broadcast
announcements, or on a sign posted at or near the prop-
erty.' This meeting provides the public with an opportu-
nity to interact with the facility owner and provide input
before the owner or operator submits a permit application.6'
Despite some concern that this meeting comes too soon in
the permitting process, 62 the proposed requirement became
55. RCRA Rule, supra note 39, at 63418.
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. RCRA Manual, supra note 37, at 2-19. According to EPA's publication of the
expanded public participation rule in the Federal Register, several sources within
and outside the agency recommended enhanced public participation that resulted
in the promulgation of this rule. EPA's Hazardous Waste Minimization and Com-
bustion Strategy calls for the development of mechanisms to ensure those local
communities are fully informed about the RCRA decision-making process. RCRA
Rule, supra note 39, at 63418. In addition, the National Performance Review, the
RCRA Implementation Study and the Permits Improvement Team each recom-
mended expanded public participation in the permitting process. Id. Several
sources outside EPA, including environmental groups and trade associations,
have also supported expanded and enhanced public participation. Id.
59. This requirement particularly addressed the concern that the public was not
involved at a meaningful phase of the permitting process. RCRA Rule, supra note
39, at 63418. Prior to the expanded rule, the permitting process did not involve
the public formally until the permitting agency issued a draft permit or an intent
to deny a permit. Id. at 63420. "In many cases, communities around RCRA fa-
cilities felt that the draft permit stage was too late to enter the process, that the
facility and the permitting agency had already made all the major decisions by
that point, and any comments the public offered would have no real effect. Insuf-
ficient opportunity for communities to become involved in environmental decision-
making is a contributing factor to environmental justice concerns." Id.
60. Id. at 63418.
61. This meeting also allows the public to interact and communicate with the
applicant before the agency reviews the application. The permitting agency is also
required to mail a notice to interested people when the facility submits its appli-
cation. Id. This notice must inform members of the general public where they can
examine the application at the same time the agency reviews it. Id
62. According to the EPA, few commentators opposed the proposal to have a
meeting early in the process. Id. at 63422. Among the concerns with the meeting
were that neither the applicant nor the agency could provide the public with accu-
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a part of the rule,' in hopes that the pre-application meet-
ing will improve communication.
The m6st important goal we hope to achieve from the pre-
application meeting requirement is the opening of a dialogue
between the permit applicant and the community. We believe
that the applicant should open this dialogue at the beginning
of the process. The meeting will give the public direct input
to-facility owners or operators; at the same time, facility own-
ers or operators can gain an understanding of public expec-
tations and attempt to address public concerns in their per-
mit applications.... We hope that this requirement will help
address the public concerns that public involvement occurs
too late in the RCRA permitting process. Although the agency
agrees with the commentators that the early timing of the
meeting may prevent the agency and the applicant from hav-
ing complete information, we believe that the benefits of early
public involvement and early access to information outweigh
the drawbacks of incomplete information."
As EPA worked to promulgate this rule, the agency
stressed this meeting should be flexible, informal, and in-
formative.' The beneficiaries of the rule included all
stakeholders, not only the affected communities. "[E]arlier
and more meaningful public involvement could streamline
the permitting process, since issues and concerns will be
raised at the initial point of the process."66 At least before
the agency promulgated the rule, it stressed the meeting
should be lead by the facility operator, not the agency."
rate and complete information about the facility at such an early stage: and that
the application could change dramatically between the preapplication meeting and
the application proposal. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See RCRA Expanded Public Participation and Revisions to Combustion Per-
mitting Procedures, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,680, 28,689, 28,690 (1994). Efficiency also
appeared to be a concern of the agency as it solicited comments for the proposed
rule in 1994. "Owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities, including own-
ers and operators of small businesses, should be able to meet the proposed re-
quirements for the pre-application meeting without undue burden. EPA estimates
that the costs associated with the pre-application will be small. In addition, EPA
believes that this approach will benefit the facility, as well as the public, in the
long run since the public will gain greater understanding of the facility's plans and
responsibilities." Id. at 28,689.
66. Id.
67. Id. The rule does not require the attendance of the permitting agency at the
pre-application meeting. Id The agency encourages the permitting agency to at-
tend, in appropriate circumstances, but the permitting agency is not to run the
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The Agency believes that attendance by the permitting
authority, in certain instances, may undercut one of the main
purposes of the meeting, which is to open a dialogue between
the facility and the community. In some cases, attendance by
the permitting authority might be useful in gaining a better
understanding of public perceptions and issues for a par-
ticular facility. However, it should always remain clear that it
is a facility-lead meeting. EPA believes it is important for the
public to understand that it is the facility's responsibility both
to initiate the permit process, by submitting an application to
EPA, and to inform the public of its intentions.
The language of EPA's publications regarding the new rule
emphasized flexibility at this early stage in the permit proc-
ess, particularly for the applicant conducting the preappli-
cation meeting.69 EPA noted its intention to provide facili-
ties considerable latitude when conducting these
meetings. ° The agency recognized that the term "public
meeting" might carry with it a number of connotations.'
EPA sought to dispel the idea that these public meetings
would be the same as public hearings by encouraging the
facilities to be creative in their approach toward conducting
the meeting. 72 This creativity in implementation is designed
to encourage constructive and open participation with
meeting. 60 Fed. Reg. at 63,423.
68. 59 Fed. Reg. at 28,690 EPA solicited comments relating to this approach,
particularly whether the permitting agency should be present at the pre-
application meeting. lI Comments varied. Some supported permitting agency
attendance because the agency would provide the meeting with credibility and a
source of accurate information. Others expressed concerns that agency atten-
dance would interfere with the "open and informal dialogue" between the facility
owner and the public. 60 Fed. Reg. at 63,422.
69. See id., 63,419.
70. 59 Fed. Reg. at 28,690.
71. Id. at 28,691. In the field of law, most readers would associate the word
"hearing" with a trial or adjudicatory proceeding. In administrative rule-making.
.public hearing" or "public comment" is used synonymously to refer to a public
meeting where members of the general public are allowed to attend and testify
before the governmental decision-making body. This does not include or cover the
adjudicatory proceedings that agencies may enter into as required by section
553(c) of the APA. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S.
742 (1972); United States v. Florida East Coast Railway. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
EPA, through discussions with community relations experts from a variety of
backgrounds, found that "'public meeting' means many things to many people. "
In most cases... it appears that people view public meetings as being similar to
public hearings." 59 Fed. Reg. at 28,691.
72. Id.
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members of the affected communities. "3 EPA did not, how-
ever, proscribe language to encourage or require facilities to
strive toward and achieve the goals of the rule. 4 Instead,
EPA decided to pursue the goal indirectly by offering guid-
ance to the facilities in conducting these meetings.75
The development of [the expanded public participation] rule
has, from the start, involved a balance between promoting
broader, more equitable public participation while maintain-
ing the flexibility for individual permit writers, facilities, and
communities to adopt the most appropriate, site-specific ap-
proach consistent with the principles of fairness and open-
ness. Some of the principles underlying the proposed and fi-
nal rules are inherently difficult to prescribe through
regulation. For example, it is possible to require an applicant
to hold a meeting; it is much more difficult to require through
regulation that the meeting be conducted in an equitable
fashion, since the steps required to accomplish this objective
will necessarily vary from situation to situation. 6
EPA's policy directive to include environmental justice
concerns and ensure equal participation in the permitting
process can be found, in part, in the promulgated regula-
tion. Efforts "strongly encouraged" by EPA include, but
are not limited to, the following: (1) providing interpreters, if
needed, for public meetings;78 (2) providing multilingual fact
sheets and other information;79 (3) tailoring the public par-
ticipation program to the specific needs of each commu-
73. Id. EPA did not require any particular format to accomplish this goal. "The
facility may accomplish this goal through any of a variety of meeting formats. EPA
further encourages innovation in the type of public meeting by allowing the facility
to choose the medium by which it reports the record of the meeting to EPA. as
long as the medium provides an adequate record of the meeting. For example, fa-
cilities may choose to tape-record discussions at the meeting or find another ef-
fective medium with which the public is comfortable." Id.
74. See RCRA Rule, supra note 39, at 63,419.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Concerns about the practical application of such "encouragement" and
"guidance" are discussed infra, note 178 and accompanying text. EPA did not of-
fer complete directive in the final rule. See RCRA Rule, supra note 39, at 63,420.
78. RCRA Manual, supra note 37, at 2-19 ("Communicating with the community
in its language is essential for the two-way information flow to ensure the public
an equitable voice in RCRA public participation activities.")
79. Id. ('Making sure that the materials presented to the public are written
clearly in the community's primary language.")
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nity; ° (4) identifying internal channels of communication
that the community relies upon for its information, espe-
cially those channels that reach the community in its own
language; 8' and (5) encouraging the formation of a citizens
advisory group to serve as the voice of the community.82
The RCRA permitting process under the expanded public
participation rule contains few significant alterations from
traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking after the pre-
application meeting.' After the permitting agency receives
the permit application, the new rules require the agency to
provide public notice of the application and make the appli-
cation available for public review. "  The agency then re-
views the draft permit and prepares a fact sheet or state-
ment of basis," then announces a 45-day public comment
period.' Any person may request a public hearing during
this period.8" Regulations require the agency to consider
and reply to all significant comments made during the pub-
lic hearings." Additional activities before the final permit
decision may include workshops, informal meetings, and
providing fact sheets and press releases about the facility. 9
The agency responds to all significant comments raised
80. Id. at 2-19 - 2-20 ("Developihg a program that specifically addresses the
community's needs will demonstrate to community members [the facility's and
permitting agencys] interest in achieving environmental equity and fostering a
seq6iof cooperation.")
81. Id. at 2-20 ("Examples of these 'channels' are a particular radio show or sta-
tion, a local television station, a non-English newspaper, or even influential relig-
ious leaders. By identifying and making use of these valuable communication
channels, [the facility and the permitting agency] can be sure that the inforia-
tion... reaches its target audience.")
82. Id ("-Such groups can provide meaningful participation and empowerment
for the affected community.. . .") Professor Applegate advocates use of citizen ad-
visory boards as an alternative means of public participation. See, generaly, Ap-
plegate, supra note 7.
83. The process is clearly more enhanced and expanded in terms of public par-
ticipation avenues than traditional review-and-comment procedures. However,
concerns raised by commentators about the review-and-comment procedures,
both basic and enhanced, remain applicable. See, generally, Applegate, supra
note 7.
84. RCRA Manucl, supra note 37, at 3-16.
85. Id. at 3-18. This fact sheet explains "the principal facts and the significant
factual, legal, methodological and policy questions considered in preparing the
draft permit." Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 3-19.
88. See40 C.F.R § 124.11.
89. RCRA ManuaL, supm note 37, at 3-17.
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during the public comment period, or during any hearing,
then issues a notice of a final permit decision.'
III. ADDRESSING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN PUBUIC HEARINGS
TO IMPROVE THE PUBLIC'S ACCESS To PARTICIPATION IN THE
RULE-MAKING PROCESS
A. Inclusion and Barriers to Public Participation
1. The Goal of Public Participation
Public participation in the rule-making process enables
an administrative agency to make informed decisions about
the people its decisions might affect. Increasing public
participation also improves the public's perception of an
agency and its processes. As community members partici-
pate in decision-making, they are more likely to believe
their views have been heard and incorporated, as well as to
understand the rationale behind the ultimate decision.
When members of the public are allowed to participate in
the input process, they are able to determine first-hand
whether the agency is accurately representing their inter-
ests. Thus, the people act as watchdogs of the government.
Participation can enhance and aid the political process sur-
rounding administrative agencies, because the public
agency's constituents are given the opportunity to observe,
first-hand, the challenges and decision-making the agency
faces.9' Public inclusion in the process can promote a bet-
ter understanding of the agency and increase political sup-
port for the agency if the situation is handled properly in
the eyes of the public.' Administrative authorities or rep-
resentatives, in turn, are more accountable and react better
90. Id. at 3-32.
91. "Constituents" refers to a broader number of groups and citizens than to
private citizens. It extends to representatives of consumer, environmental and
minority associations; trade, industrial, agricultural, and labor organizations;
public health, scientific, and professional societies; civic associations; public offi-
cials; and governmental and educational associations. See RCRA Manual, supra
note 37, at 2-1. See aLso 40 C.F.R. § 25.3(a)(1992).
92. RCRA Manual, supra note 37. EPA considers "public participation" as a
stakeholder activity, whereby the dialogue and interaction among each of the
stakeholder increases the public's ability to understand and influence the agency's
decisions.
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to the needs of the public. Additionally, public hearings
help administrative agencies comply with the various "Sun-
shine Laws,"' designed to increase accountability, improve
public confidence in the process and improve decision-
making.
A larger number of participants, however, may diminish
an individual's perception of influence over the decision-
making process.' An individual may feel her or his partici-
pation becomes irrelevant as more people join the process.
Nonetheless, it is appropriate to increase public participa-
tion when those who are encouraged to participate are
those most likely to be affected by the agency's decision.
Logically speaking, those individuals who will be directly
affected by an agency's decision should have some priority
to voice their opinions in a public hearing.9"
An agency serves its interests by increasing public par-
ticipation for another reason: to avoid dramatic shifts in its
power. The very nature of an administrative agency gives it
a great deal of power in making rules, which can, and Often
do, have the power and effect of law. The authority for this
power comes from the legislature, which is influenced by
public opinion and popular politics. If an agency, though
operating fully within its authority, begins to act, in ways
that negatively affect members of the community, it is pos-
sible that the consequences of such actions may prove fatal
93. Among the various Sunshine Laws are those which require administrative
agencies to conduct agency business in the open. These laws also require agency
decisions and findings to be accessible to the general public. See Sunshine Act. 5
U.S.C. §552(b) (1994): Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552 (1994):
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. 11044 (1994).
94. One individual's perception of his or her influence cannot detract from the
goals of public participation. For example, in the EPA model, stakeholders in
agency decisions- the public, the waste management facility, and the agency-
form a participation triangle. Communication between the three prongs of the
model is the key to successful public participation. To achieve the necessary
communication, inclusion is necessary. An individual will have his or her voice,
but the interaction requires dialogue from each of the stakeholders. See RCRA
Manual supra note 37, at 2-1 and 2-3.
95. EPA stresses that "a vital and successful public participation program re-
quires a dialogue, not a monologue." Id. at 2-3. In its model, information and
concerns must be shared among all three prongs of the model. This active two-
way communications process, in turn, creates a "feedback loop" between each of
the prongs. The agency distributes a fact sheet to concerned parties, then enter-
tains comments from the stakeholders. Through this process, the agency may
monitor public interest and concern, adjust public participation activities, and re-
spond quickly and effectively to changing needs. Id.
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to the agency's power.
2. Barriers to Public Participation in Practice
Although holding a hearing where public testimony or
comments are received is designed to facilitate communica-
tion between the public and administrative decision-
makers, often little communication occurs. Participants
frequently perceive that agency rule-making is merely the
first round in a battle that will culminate in a court deci-
sion. Practical considerations' often inhibit the initial par-
ticipation.
a. Cultural Barriers to Participation
Where an agency's decision may disproportionately affect
minorities, 7 it is appropriate to encourage the maximum
level of participation from the affected minorities. , An un-
derstanding of the cultural composition of the United States
and the differences between the various cultures is vital for
an agency if it is to include each culture in an effective
public participation process.
The cultural composition of the United States is a melee
96. These considerations, discussed below as barriers to participation, include
cultural barriers, time constraints, financial barriers, technical barriers, the influ-
ence of administrative authority, and language barriers.
97. The term "minorities." as used here means persons who self-identify on the
U.S. Census as non-white or Hispanic. Such a definition follows the usage of the
Commission for Racial Justice. United Church of Christ, Toxic Wastes and Race in
the United States 63 (1987).
98. As discussed infra, numerous studies have found a disproportionate impact
on minorities through the EPA's decisions involving environmental hazards. See
e.g., Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discuimi-
nation, 41 U. KAN. L REV. 271, 273 (1992), citing Harvey L. White, Hazardous
Waste Incineration and Minority Communities, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE ("A 1992 empirical study of com-
mercial toxic waste facilities approved by authorities in the Detroit, Michigan area
found that minority residents constituted only eighteen percent of the local popu-
lation at a distance greater than one and one-half miles from the facilities, but
that within one mile, the percentage increased to forty-eight percent.); ROBERT D.
BULARD, DUMPING IN DDIXE: RACE, CLASS AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUA=nY 51-52 (1990):
Robert D. Bullard, Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, in The
Proceedings of the Michigan Conference on Race and the Incidence of Environmental
Hazards 18 YALE J. INV'L L. (1990) ("In Houston, Texas, seven of the city's eight
waste incinerators, all five city landfills, and five of the six private landfills per-
mitted within municipal limits by the Texas Department of Health are located In
census tracts where a majority of residents are Afrlican-Amercan.")
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of many smaller cultural groups, or microcultures.99 The
dominant culture of a society is the monolith or macrocul-
ture.'" The smaller components of that macro-culture are
the micro-cultures.'°' Micro-cultures consist of unique in-
stitutions, values and cultural elements that are not uni-
versal but shared primarily by members of a specific ethnic
and/or cultural group."
Ethnic groups are types of micro-cultural groups that
have unique characteristics which set them apart from
other cultural groups. 3 Six major elements or components
are useful in interpreting the behavior of micro-cultural or
ethnic groups in Western nation-states, including (1) values
and behavioral styles; (2) language and dialects; (3) nonver-
bal communications; (4) cultural cognitiveness; (5) per-
spectives, world views, and frames of reference; and (6)
identification. These elements within an ethnic group, al-
though highly interrelated, are conceptually distinct and
identifiable. An individual's degree of ethnic behavior and
characteristics can be determined by ascertaining the ex-
tent to which he or she has behavior and characteristics
that reflect these ethnic variables.° 4
The first major element for interpreting the behavior of
multi-cultural or ethnic groups is value. Values are ab-
stract, generalized principles of behavior to which members
of a society attach a high worth or regard. Values influence
behavior and perception.' 5 Generally, values encompass
more than morality. They are a way of appreciating life.
They set priorities and define relationships within a group.
The language and dialect of a micro-culture are important
to understand the communication of a group and interpret
its behavior. Language is a reflection of how people view
and interpret the world. Within most nation-states, people
speak a national language, but within that language exist
99. JAMEs A. BANKS, MULT-ETHNIC EDUCATION 74-75 (1988). See aso, JAMES A.
BANKS, TEACHING STRATEGIES FOR ETmc STuDIES 74-75 (1988).
100. BANKS, MULT-ETHNIC EDUCATION, supra note 99, at 74-75.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 75-76.
103. A distinction must be made between genetics and nationality with respect
to members of a certain culture, and the characteristics found within each cul-
ture. It is the characteristics within the different cultures, which must be under-
stood to achieve effective communication.
104. BANKS, MULT-ETrHNIc EDUCATION, supra note 99, at 81, 83.
105. Id. at 75-76.
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variations in dialect."° Dialect refers to a regional variety of
language distinguished by pronunciation, grammar, or vo-
cabulary, especially a variety of speech differing from the
standard literary language or speech pattern of the culture
in which it exists.' 0 7 Cultural differences are both reflected
and perpetuated by languages and dialects."°
Nonverbal communication and cognition are also distinct
among and within micro-cultures. How people look at each
other and what a particular look or expression means often
varies within the different micro-cultural groups of a soci-
ety. Nonverbal communication often reveals latent, but im-
portant components of a culture or micro-culture.'0° Cul-
tural cognitiveness occurs when individuals or a group are
aware of and think about their culture or micro-culture as
unique and distinct from other cultures within a society.
Cognitiveness involves cultural knowledge, awareness, and
judgment."0
Certain perspectives, points of view, and frames of refer-
ence are normative within each culture and micro-cultural
group. This does not mean that each individual within a
particular culture or micro-culture endorses a particular
point of view or perspective. It does mean, however, that
particular views and perspectives occur more frequently
within some micro-cultural groups than do others."' Japa-
nese-American perspectives on their World War II intem-
ment, African-American perspectives on slavery and the
civil rights movement of the 1960s, and women's perspec-
tives on independence and individualization are various ex-
amples of perspectives held by micro-cultural groups that
may differ from perspectives within other micro-cultural
groups or the macro-culture." 2
Identification within a micro-cultural or cultural group
refers to the act of recognizing or aligning oneself with a
group through some distinctly recognizable characteristic or
behavior."3 When an individual identifies with a cultural or
106. Id. at 77.
107. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIvERSrrY DICTIONARY 372 (1984).
108. BANKS, MuLm-EmNIC EDUCATION, supra note 99, at 77.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 78.
112. Id.
113. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERrnY DICTIONARY 607 (1984)
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micro-cultural group, he or she feels a part of the group;
internalizes its goals, interests, and aspirations; and inter-
nalizes its values and standards." 4  Identification is a
method of labeling one's self. In labeling one's self, it is an
individual's internal view of himself or herself which is inte-
gral, not how society views him"5 . For example, since a
person's ethnic group is not always readily apparent, a
Mexican-American woman may label herself Latino, al-
though her outward appearance may be that of an Anglo-
American. Culture impacts people's behavior and, in turn,
the way they participate in public forums. A person's pub-
lic behavior and the meaning of that behavior can differ
radically from one culture to another. Emphatically, people
are not "Just the same the world over." As human behavior
varies from one culture to another, so too does political be-
havior."6
When attempts are made to understand how and why
multi-cultural communications fail, cultural differences are
often ignored." 7 One reason for this is that cultural differ-
ences play a covert role in the communication process.
When people from widely different backgrounds interact in
public meetings, their agenda does not typically include a
discussion of the way they interpret each other's behavior,
the reasons they interpret it as they do, or the way they ex-
pect the meeting to evolve. Thus, participants assume they
are all assigning the same meaning to these matters."'
In order to develop authentic and effective relationships
with persons from different subcultures, it is important not
only to accept differences, but also to be aware of and re-
spect those differences. These are difficult matters to dis-
cuss, since generalizations about ethnic groups are often
perceived as inherently offensive. But no progress in multi-
cultural understanding is possible unless it is first accepted
114. BANKS, MuLrI-EmNIc EDUCAiON, supra note 99, at 78.
115. For African Americans the various interpretations of "black" create a
unique situation. An American black perceives himself or herself differently in
different places in the country. In many foreign countries, an American black
would not even be considered a "black." This is due in large part to the incorpo-
ration of the American black into the dominant white culture, as well as the white
culture's labeling of the American black culture.
116. Oliver H. Woshinsky, CULTURE AND PoI'mcs, AN INMRODUCnON TO MASS AND
ELrIE PoIMCAL BEHAVIOR 2 (1995).
117. Thomas Kochman, BLAcK AND WHim STYLES IN CoNFucr 7 (1983).
118. Id.
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that some unfair (and therefore offensive) generalizations
about a culture are widely believed, and that other generali-
zations, whether widely believed or not, have some basis in
truth. Both sets of generalizations play a role in multi-
cultural misunderstanding.
However controversial any list of cultural differences
might be, it is easy to construct a list of differences be-
tween, for example, African-Americans and Anglo-
Americans. One may consider these two lists of "assump-
tions that block authentic relations""9 between blacks and
whites as an example of common generalizations made
between two cultural groups:
Assumptions Whites Make:
-- Color is unimportant in interpersonal relations.
-- Blacks will always welcome and appreciate inclusion in
white society.
-- Open recognition of color may embarrass blacks.
-- Blacks are trying to use whites.
-- Blacks can be stereotyped
-- White society is superior to black society.
-- "Liberal" whites are free of racism.
-- All blacks are alike in their attitudes and behavior.
-- Blacks must be controlled.
Assumptions Blacks Make:
-- All whites are alike.
--There are no "soul brothers" among whites.
-- Whites have all the power.
-- Whites are always trying to use blacks.
-- Whites are united in their attitude toward blacks....
--Whites are not really trying to understand the situation of
blacks
-- Whites have to deal on black terms.
-- Silence is a sign of hostility.
-- Whites cannot and will not change....
--The only way to gain attention is through confrontation.
-- All whites are deceptive.
119. From PHP R. HARRIs & ROBERr T. MORAN. MANAGING CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES 359 (1991).
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-- All whites will let you down in the "crunch."
20
These assumptions can be unconscious, yet it is impor-
tant to recognize distinctive attitudes one group may make
about another. The importance of each group's behavior,
particularly nonverbal behavior that blacks and whites
demonstrate to each other, "is apparent in the adage, 'Your
actions speak so loudly, I can hardly hear what you say.'"'
2
'
b. Other Barriers Influencing Multicultural
Participation
i. Time Constraints
Time constraints often dictate the format of the public
hearing process. When an issue is important and has a
large impact on a number of different constituencies, it
would be practically impossible to hear every word each in-
dividual has to say about a particular topic. Beyond the is-
sue of time, it may also be inefficient to encourage such ex-
haustive communication for fear of a large amount of
repetition. On the other hand, a time constraint may affect
a person's feeling of powerlessness and frustration.
Sometimes administrative agencies must deal with a vari-
ety of different rules or administrative matters at one
meeting. The agenda for the meeting may be long and the
particular issue that an individual wants to address is not
scheduled for a specific time or may be moved around by a
chairman, requiring members of the public to sit through
an entire meeting just in case their issue is brought up
sooner than expected."
The social position of an individual may also play a sig-
nificant role in the amount of time he or she will have to
wait to deliver his or her testimony. Although some chair-
persons or facilitators try to be fair to all members of the
public, sometimes more powerful, connected participants
120. See id.
121. Id. at 361.
122. For example, the South Coast Air Quality Management District in Califor-
nia has been known to reschedule issues that were on the end of the agenda for
hearing earlier in the day. Community activists who took time off from work to
attend the afternoon hearing discovered that their issue had been decided several
hours earlier. See South Coast Air Quality Management District, Adoption of 1995
Air Quality Management Plan (AQMD), August 3, 1995.
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are able to influence the timing of the agenda and manipu-
late the hearing to the disadvantage of other, less influen-
tial members of the public." 3 Because of the problems that
time constraints can impose on the process, parties who do
not have the resources to attend several daylong hearings
on a particular issue for the chance to testify are left at a
considerable disadvantage.
ii. Financial Barriers
Even if the average member of the public had the time to
spend attending a lengthy public hearing process, financial
limitations can often pose significant barriers on participa-
tion. 24  For example, if meetings are held at inconvenient,
distant locations, members of the public may not be able to
travel to the forums. In addition, meetings held during the
123. Id. During a hearing on the adoption of the 1995 Air Quality Management
Plan, the South Coast Air Quality Management District would not let the "average"
member of the public testify on the issue until after 12 elected officials and major
representatives of industry spoke first. The preferential treatment of those offi-
cials permitted them to testify for as long as they wished, sometimes in excess of
20 minutes each. When other members of the public were finally able to testify,
they were limited to three minutes to make their comments. While in some cases
three minutes was adequate time for participants to voice their concerns, others
were cut off and forced merely to turn to written testimony. Although the AQMD
staff s usual policy was to write responses to comments and publish them a
month or two later, in this particular case the AQMD Board went to vote on the
matter that evening. Industrial lobbyists in environmental rule-making proceed-
ings sometimes have close ties to politicians who have influence or indirect control
over an administrative agency's officials. These individuals often have the oppor-
tunity to present their case with ample consideration of their time and the amount
of comments they have on proposed rules that may affect the income of that com-
pany.
124. Laura F. Rothstein, Presentatfon of the Consumer Viewpoint in Federal Ad-
minlstratdve Proceedings- What's the Best Alternative?, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 565,
567 ("Probably the most serious problem faced by a consumer or consumer group
desiring to participate in judicial or regulatory proceedings is that of inadequate
resources.... Generally speaking, regulatory proceedings take place in Washing-
ton or other large cities with agency field offices. An appearance at such pro-
ceedings is often financially prohibitive for [average] consumers. Expenses usually
include transportation, housing, costs of preparing documents, and costs of any
clerical or professional services used in preparing the presentation. While some
public interest groups have participated in a significant number of proceedings,
the financial support for participation requires substantial organization and public
support. The appearance of consumer representatives at administrative proceed-
ings is thus the exception rather than the rule. The general lack of adequate fi-
nancial resources is evidenced by the gross disparity, both in terms of dollars
spent and the number of proceedings in which there has been participation ... in
regulatory and adjudicatory proceedings.")
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working day may preclude members of the public from par-
ticipating because they may be unable to take off from
work.
iii. Technical Barriers
An issue may require an extensive hearing simply be-
cause of its extreme technical complexity. m Legislators of-
ten justify delegating power to administrative agencies by
noting that an issue is too complex and requires the techni-
cal expertise of a panel of experts. 2 Complexity, which
defeats legislators and their staffs, is bound to be a barrier
to the average citizen. 27 Environmental cases are especially
prone to daunting technical complexity. In one case, in-
volving the siting of a hazardous waste facility, the Envi-
ronmental Impact Report contained nine terms that could
not be located in Webster's unabridged dictionary.1 2' The
125. For example, without a degree in chemistry, it may be impossible to under-
stand the different photochemical reactions between various volatile organic pal-
lutants such as nitrous oxide and sulfur dioxides. Absent such understandings,
hearing participants will not be able to evaluate accurately the subtle differences
in alternative solutions that the administrative agency could consider.
126. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 1189, 1216 (1986). See also Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Mis-
fit: Public Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN ENVIL L.J. 3, 17. Un-
der the more traditional expertise model of administrative decision-making, the
structure of the rule-making process relies heavily on the ideal of formal expertise
of the administrators. As it applies to the Environmental Protection Agency, the
model relies on the administrator's ability to apply science in knowledge to solve
environmental problems. Inclusion of the public in administrative activity has
caused the administrative system to move to a more pluralistic model, where the
administrators act more neutrally and all groups have the potential to participate
in the administrative process.
127. See Rothstein, supra note 124, at 567 ("Another serious problem is the
public's lack of expertise. Consumers often fail to appreciate the effects of ad-
ministrative or Judicial proceedings. Even if they understand the impact of a pro-
ceeding, consumers usually lack the means to provide economic, scientific or
other technical data in support of their positions. Consumers may also lack as-
sistance in making an effective presentation of whatever information they do have.
Again, insufficient financial resources prevent hiring professionals who could pro-
vide the necessary expertise.") See also Gauna, supra note 126, at 17-18. An ex-
treme view of the expertise model of administrative decision-making views the pro-
cess as requiring no public participation. Under this view, "[algency officials could
regulate according to clear legislative mandate; in absence of such clarity, officials
could use their expertise to fill in the detail." Clearly, however, the modem ad-
ministrative system has moved away not only from this extreme view, but also
from the ideal of the expertise in the traditional administrative system.
128. El Pueblo Par El Airey Ague Limpio v. County of Kings, No. 366045 (Ca.
Superior Ct. 1991) (Petitioner's Reply Memorandum to Respondents' and Real
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report was said to be "difficult to understand even for Eng-
lish speakers because the document was written in highly
technical language, employing numerous obscure scientific
termS."
129
The use of agency expertise under the traditional model of
administrative rulemaking often substitutes for the partici-
pation of the groups excluded from the rulemaking proc-
ess.130 In the quest for environmental justice, "it might be
too easy to conclude that an agency expert knows what is
best for poor, uneducated people of color."13' Clearly, this
view illustrates that the traditional model of expertise not
only fails to address multicultural communication and in-
teraction, but also excludes participation by those affected
altogether. Environmental justice activists respond by
noting community residents are experts themselves and
should be consulted in the process.
32
The recognition of the community resident as expert is a re-
jection of traditional reliance solely upon formal expertise.
Environmental regulation cannot proceed while blind to social
realities, and social realities cannot be explored adequately
without the assistance of those whose lives are most im-
pacted by environmental risk. In a very real sense, residents
from impacted communities are experts in the reality of envi-
ronmental inequity. Indigenous, cultural, and community
Parties Opposition at 16 n. 11).
129. Id.
130. Gauna. supra note 126, at 32.
131. Id. Professor Gauna cites a statement from the former president of the
National Academy of Sciences, who argued that "most members of the public usu-
ally don't know enough about any given complicated technical matter to make
meaningful informed judgments... [these decisions should be made by 'knowl-
edgeable wise men [of science.]'" id. (citing Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade
in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1613, 1672 (1995); Philip Handler, In
Science, No Advances Without Risks. U.S. NEws & WoRLu REP., Sept 15, 1980, at
60)).
132. Gauna, supra note 126, at 35-36. Professor Gauna discusses an environ-
mental study investigating the consumption of fish for a determination of the cri-
teria of water quality standards. Id. at 33. The study's assumptions stemmed
from surveys of licensed fishermen. The conclusions reached were based on these
surveys, but failed to take into consideration those more dependent on a heavier
diet of fish. Id. The study failed to take into consideration, for example, several
poverty-stricken African-American communities in a heavily polluted 100-mile
stretch along the Mississippi River. The residents of these communities relied
heavily on local fish as a part of their diet, yet the report did not include such ex-
amples as part of the assumptions that were used to develop the water quality
standards. Id. at 34.
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expertise arises not from formal study but also from intimacy
with social and physical environments over time and often
over generations. These forms of expertise are exogenous to
the agency and are as important as formal expertise in law,
science and technology. A decision-making structure that
precludes meaningful participation by community groups
cannot hope to achieve systematically equitable environ-
mental protection. 133
Such insights remain applicable to all agency rulemaking
procedures. Any agency decision that will impact a par-
ticular group of citizens must take the experiences of those
citizens into account. Understanding these experiences re-
quires an understanding of the cultural differences between
these citizens and members of the agency or members con-
ducting studies. Recognizing the expertise of the public is
the first step; understanding and appreciating the different
insights of these citizens should be the ultimate goal.
iv. Influence of Administrative Authority
The administrative staff conducting a hearing can have a
negative impact on the process. Because of the high degree
of influence staff members have on a hearing's organiza-
tion,'34 they can, in their exercise of power, inadvertently set
a tone that is not conducive to public participation. 3 5 Ad-
ditionally, as people become experts in a technical field,
their technical familiarity with the issues may result in less
familiarity with the public's viewpoint. 36  These experts'
133. Id. at 35-36.
134. Agency officials traditionally implemented legislative direction in an earlier
model of administrative law, acting as a "transmission belt" for the legislature.
Under this model, the legislatures set the boundaries under which the agencies
could act. The courts' function was to contain the discretion to assure it fit within
those boundaries. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1787; See also Gauna, supra note 126, at 18.
135. Agency regulation is legislative in function, as the agencies act under leg-
islative directive. Id. As administrative law evolved, judicial concern was not the
inclusion of the public in the process, but protection from intrusion on individual
property and liberty rights affected by the agency regulations. Id; See aLso Stew-
art, supra note 134, at 1669-70; BERNARD ScHwARrz, ADMmmSTRAnfVE LAw §1.5 (3d
ed. 1991). As the modem administrative system brought more inclusion of the
general public, courts began to extend participation rights and standing rights to
protest agency action. Gauna, supra note 126, at 20: Stewart, supra note 134, at
1670.
136. As the public has and continues to become more involved In the adminis-
trative process, agency decision-making becomes a process involving a broader
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lack of exposure to popular (or even unpopular) trends,
customs, or beliefs can result in insensitivity to the cogni-
tive limitations of a "lay" person who does not have the
same level of technical expertise.
Similarly, social and cultural differences between admin-
istrators and the public can hamper communication. Gov-
ernment employees who are close to their work and the bu-
reaucratic culture of the workplace have a tendency to
present information in a manner that is not immediately
familiar to most people. For example, statistics and graphs
may be difficult for many people to interpret. The difference
in such presentation or communication techniques can of-
ten represent a barrier to even the simplest exchange of in-
formation. Government employees who are responsible for
making administrative presentations may also have a
higher level of education than those of the audience. This
difference alone can create a barrier to communication if
the communication is not expressed on a mutually under-
standable level.
v. Language Barriers
Obviously a key element of effective communication is the
ability for all participants in the communications process
(not only the speaker and the listener, but also third party
observers) to speak the same language. As the immigrant
population grows and diversifies,'37 administrative actions
will necessarily affect greater numbers of non-English
speakers.'38
range of interest representation. Essentially, the administrative rule-making pro-
cess has evolved into one much like a legislative law-making process; indeed, it
has become a "surrogate political process." Stewart, supra note 134, at 1670;
Gauna, supra note 126, at 20. Less familiarity of the public's viewpoints on the
part of the administrators leads administrative rule-making back in the direction
of the model where expertise of the administrators is germane to the process,
rather than the model maximizing interest representation.
137. In 1990, 2.89 % (6,627,201 people) of the United States population spoke
English "less than well." U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of PopuktLon.
CPHL-1233. Today, five million undocumented immigrants reside in the United
States, and the figure is rising by about 275,000 annually. David LaGesse, INS
Believes 5 Million in U.S. llegally, THE DALIAs MORNING NEws, February 8. 1997).
There are obviously many people living in the United States who are legal resi-
dents but do not know how to speak English. Administrative agencies face an in-
creasing diversity in the population they serve.
138. The Board of Supervisors of Kings County, California. granted a permit to
Chemical Waste Management, Inc., in 1991 for a hazardous waste incinerator to
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As with other hurdles facing multi-cultural communities
in their attempts to gain access to the administrative deci-
sion-making process, language barriers impede effective
communication. Unless administrative agencies recognize
and respond to different languages and dialects, they will
be unable to benefit from the input of many of their affected
members of the community. Likewise, affected members of
the community will have a negative (and possibly incorrect)
view of the administrative process, and government as a
whole.
B. Consequences of Barriers to Participation and Non-
Participation
The primary consequence of inadequate public participa-
tion in the rule-making process is that loss of information
leads to bad decision-making. For example, the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development can hardly be ex-
pected to make accurate assessments of the need for new
housing if they fail to obtain feedback from community
leaders and low to moderate income families.
In addition to the possibility that an agency such as EPA
may make bad decisions without appropriate input from
members of the public, an agency may also lose the benefit
of effectively communicating important facts. For example,
as members of the community engage in the process of pro-
viding input, they are also able to hear from administrative
officials about the level of difficulty and/or complexity that
goes into making the decision.'39 Such input may make the
public less inclined to oppose agency actions.
be placed in a community composed of 95% Latinos, including 40 percent non-
English speakers, following a review process in which neither the Environmental
Impact Report nor any of the public hearing notices or testimony were translated
into Spanish. El Pueblo. supra note 128, at 3-4. Although the waste incinerator
was to have extremely dire consequences on the quality of life for a majority of the
community's inhabitants, almost half of the members of the community were
completely incapable of understanding the course of any of the proceedings due to
language barriers alone. Although often the government offers interpreters and
.signers" for foreign speakers and the hearing impaired, these services are subject
to the usual financial constraints that public agencies experience on a much more
frequent basis.
139. Correspondingly, public participants may also hear other community lead-
ers or their neighbors speak while waiting to address the public agency. This can
sometimes allow people to appreciate each other's positions and encourage com-
promise.
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Effective public participation in the decision-making proc-
ess may also increase the probability that the most desir-
able rules or policies are chosen. According to one com-
mentator,
It has been demonstrated that the benefits of free legal advice
and services to the poor are neutralized if the poor are ex-
pected to continue to support and respect the institutions
that have neither involved them in the decision-making proc-
ess nor sought to earn their confidence. The most important
consideration is that the poor be able to have their views
heard in a dignified and receptive atmosphere. In the final
analysis, the individual and collective attitudes of the rule-
makers are of paramount importance.'40
There are some tangential consequences that can result
from failure to allow members of the public to speak in the
way they need or want before a governmental agency. So-
cial, cultural and language barriers in today's society rein-
force the feelings of rejection which individuals have experi-
enced since their introduction into foreign social circles.
14
This rejection often results in withdrawal or rebellion that
manifests itself in a pervasive silence, or failure to assert
one's ideas. This restriction in the flow of communications
from the minority segments of the culture not only deprives
our society of the possible positive contributions these peo-
ple may be able to offer, but it reinforces the separation
between diverse groups.
41
Some administrative agencies have recognized the need
for members of the public to engage in non-traditional
methods of public speaking. During Social Security Ad-
ministrative hearings, administrative law judges often allow
claimants the opportunity to explain their stories in their
own words."4 This can be quite beneficial.
140. Allan Ashman, Representation for the Poor in State Rule-Making, 24
VANDERBILTL. REV. 1, 3 (1970).
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Linda S. Durston & Linda G. Mills, Toward a New Dynamic in
Poverty Client Empowerment: The Rhetoric, Politics and Therapeutics of Opening
Statements in Social Security Disability Hearings, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 121
(1996) (Failure to speak in their familiar tongue "deprives the claimant (or
speaker] the assertion of her voice in an institutional setting, reinforcing the es-
sentializing and marginalizing forces that gave rise to her silence in the first
place.")
143. Id. at 120.
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From a rhetorical standpoint, an opening statement, intro-
duction, or exordium is essential to establish a starting point
for virtually any kind of communication. An audience's level
of attention and retention is highest at the beginning of a
speech, and the exordium raises the audience's expectations
about the subject and form of the discourse. Moreover, the
exordium sets pace, proportion, tone, character, stance and
style.
Such public speaking techniques may not follow the tra-
ditional model of administrative hearings. However, one
must remember that the main purpose of public hearings is
to facilitate communication. Even if unusual or non-
traditional public speaking techniques do nothing more
than gain the attention of the listener, their utility may still
be justified.
Some cultures engage in a method of public speaking
that, to the traditional administrative bureaucrat, may
seem irrelevant or tangential to the issue being discussed.
For example, some cultural segments prefer to address an
issue in an indirect approach through storytelling. Story-
telling, or other non-traditional methods of public speaking,
can help bring people from different comers of society
closer together so that mutual understanding of one's
background, history, and purpose is more deeply under-
stood.'"5 "When speaker and audience enjoy common soci-
ety, culture or shared values, the 'meeting of the minds'...
may exist already at the moment of speaking."'"
However, sometimes a non-traditional form of public
speaking goes too far and loses its audience. In certain
segments of society, particularly that of the oppressed and
under-represented minority community, communication
can be interpreted by the "mainstream" community as bor-
dering on aggressive or violent. Such differences in self-
144. Id. at 122.
145. "Storytelling is both a liberatory practice and a method used to raise con-
sciousness. It challenges, through the power and persuasiveness of Individual
experience, the uni-dimensional and essentializing accounts of the lives of people
who have been silenced. They may have been silenced both by others more politi-
cally advantaged than they who perpetuate that oppression, and also by the politi-
cally sympathetic who fail to listen closely enough." Id. See aLso, ROBERT L.
HAYMAN, JR. & NANCY LEvrr. JURISPRUDENCE: CONTEMPORARY READINGS, PROBLEMS,
AND NARRATnvES, 389-450 (1994).
146. Durston & Mills, supra note 142, at 124-125.
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expression can do more damage than good if the reaction of
the audience is that of a defensive or even offensive nature.
However, agency officials need to recognize that sometimes
emotional or para-violent speaking is in itself a form of self-
expression. For example, at one Social Security Adminis-
trative hearing, the claimant (Mrs. G.) acted out in an al-
most violent manner.'47
Mrs. G's unruly participation at her hearing was itself a po-
litical action. Yet it was an act that did little to change the
harsh landscape which constricts Mrs. G. from more sus-
tained and more effective political participation. Substantial
changes in that landscape will come only-as such fragile mo-
ments of dignity are supported and validated by law.'
Administrative agencies have recognized the need to ac-
commodate differences in languages in some cases. For ex-
ample, in 1980, the United States Depbrtment of Energy
published a 90-page Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
summary written in Spanish for a proposed radioactive
waste storage facility in New Mexico. 149  Similarly, the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment prepared a draft EIS in Spanish for two proposed
housing projects in Puerto Rico.'" These administrative de-
cisions to translate EIS documents gave those minorities
access to planning decisions from which they would have
been excluded.
147. Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REv 1, 32 (1990). Professor
White offers an excellent commentary on incorporation of minority and feminist
Ideas-into the administrative process, and illustrates the problem by discussing a
welfare recipient attending a Social Security Hearing. "Mrs. G had a hearing in
which all of the rituals of due process were scrupulously observed. Yet she did
not find her voice welcomed at that hearing. A complex pattern of social, eco-
nomic, and cultural forces underwrote the procedural formalities, repressing and
devaluing her voice." Professor White observed three dominant themes: Intimida-
tion, caused by a fear of speaking one's mind; humiliation, where even if the par-
ticipant could find the courage to speak at the administrative hearing, her words
were not likely to be heard; and objectification, due to the lack of voice in the po-
litical process. Id.
148. Id. at 52.
149. 45 Fed. Reg. 540-41 (1980).
150. 45 Fed. Reg. 538-84; 45 Fed. Reg. 80 (1980).
[Vol. 24:169
1999] Multicultural Participation In Public Hearing Process 203
C. The Responsibility for Participation Lies with the
Government and Its Agencies
The burden of increasing public participation lies with
government agencies, as well as the legislative and execu-
tive branches of the federal and state governments. Gen-
eral public policy concerns, coupled with stated policy
goals,'5 ' clearly place the burden of facilitating public par-
ticipation on the government, specifically the legislative and
executive branches of the federal and state governments.
Such a conclusion is reinforced by the courts, which have
held that "federal agencies must listen to the views of
groups representing various segments of the public before
taking action."52 Courts too have an obligation to "take the
initiative to seek out [appropriate parties]... and develop a
meaningful record."' 53 The administrative hearing process
is a government-created process, and the goverment
should follow through on the implementation of this proc-
ess. For the process to be effective, the government should
be responsible for ensuring full public participation, espe-
151. One section of a 1994 Executive Order requiring federal agencies to ad-
dress environmental justice in minority populations and low-income populations
included the following requirements for federal agencies to increase public partici-
pation and access to information:
Sec. 5-5 Public Participation and Access to Information:
"(a) The public may submit recommendations to Federal agencies relating to
the incorporation of environmental justice principles into Federal agency programs
or policies. Each Federal agency shall convey such recommendations to the
Working Group.
(b) Each Federal agency may, whenever practicable and appropriate, translate
crucial public documents, notices, and hearings relating to human health or the
environment for limited English speaking populations.
(c) Each Federal agency shall work to ensure that public documents, notices
and hearings relating to human health or the environment are concise, under-
standable, and readily accessible to the public.
(d) The Working Group shall hold public meetings, as appropriate, for the
purpose of fact-finding, receiving public comments, and conducting inquiries con-
cerning environmental juc-'ce. The Working Group shall prepare for public review
a summary of the comments and recommendations discussed at the public meet-
ings."
Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations
and Low-Income Populations, 59 Fed. Reg. 7632 (1994).
152. National Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers & Distrib. v. F.C.C., 502 F.2d
249, 257 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C.,
354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965)).
153. Id. at 249 (citing Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. A.E.C., 449 F.2d
1109, 1119 (D.C. Cir 1971) and Office of Communication of United Church of
Christ v. F.C.C.. 425 F.2d 543, 548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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cialy of those most affected.
The government is in the best position to ascertain when
it is possible or necessary to increase public participation in
the rule-making process. It is most efficient for the gov-
emment to determine, on a case-by-case basis, which
community groups should be involved, and when their in-
volvement would be necessary. Most people have neither
the resources nor the inclination to track the daily activities
of government agencies through the Federal Register
and/or the state equivalent. Even if they did have those re-
sources, most people would need a legal education to un-
derstand these documents and how their contents might
indicate that individual participation was appropriate. Ad-
ditionally, between the government and the individual, it is
primarily the government's responsibility to take account of
the issue of public participation in its rule-making proce-
dures, and to take appropriate measures to recognize cul-
tural differences among the partlcipants.'54
D. Limits of Addressing Cultural Differences Under the
Administrative Procedure Act
Among the variety of criticisms of the traditional, agency-
driven rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA)' 5 is the overly broad discretion given to
agency officials."5 Where participation is allowed, the proc-
ess tends to be adversarial in nature,'" leading to a com-
mon breakdown in communications between interested
parties and the agency itself." These limitations and criti-
154. These measures would obviously require an active role of "government,"
but the actual implementation would almost have to take place on more than one
level. Ideally, legislatures should include such recognition as part of its directive
to the agencies, and the administrators should implement means by which to
carry it out. However, practical difficulty in the implementation of such directives
requires an active role on the part of the legislature to assure the directive is car-
-led out, an active and concerted effort on the part of the administrators to assure
the recognition takes place, and the influence of the public on both the legislature
and the administrators to assure multi-cultural differences are recognized. Such
an effort goes beyond any pluralistic view of the administrative system, which
concerns maximum interest representation. See Gauna, supra note 126, at 19.
155. 5 U.S.C. § 551 etseq. (1994).
156. See Dennis H. Esposito & Kristen W. Ulbrich. Negotiated Rulemaking in
Environmental Law, 46 IRI.B.J. 5 (1998); See also Mee, supra note 8.
157. Esposito & Ulbrich, supra note 156.
158. See id. at 5. (-Traditional notice and comment rulemaking... is often an
inherently lengthy process involving significant costs to both the agency and pri-
[Vol. 24:169
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cisms of the traditional approach has led to the develop-
ment of new models of rulemaking, including negotiated
rulemaking,' 59 which attempt to make agency rulemaking
more process-oriented and inclusionary.' 6' However, even if
participation is encouraged and communication is facili-
tated by these newer methods, miscommunication between
persons of different cultural backgrounds will hamper the
process as much as it did under the traditional approach.
These new approaches must also take into consideration
the cultural differences of its participants or the process
cannot facilitate communication.
Under the APA, an agency must notify the public of its
intent to establish a rule, then allow all interested parties to
submit data, views, or arguments to the rule-making
body.' This process is repeated after a draft rule is pro-
posed by the staff and again when the final rule is pro-
posed." At each step in the process, the agency is sup-
posed to consider the comments that are made by members
of the public and develop the rule accordingly. This mass
of information makes up the record, upon which the agency
decisions must be made.' The presentation of information
from the public takes the form of oral testimony at a public
hearing, written testimony, or both."
The first opportunity for public comment is usually dur-
ing the Notice of Rule-Making stage. Under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, administrative bodies must notify the
public of their intent to formulate a rule. 65 This notice in-
cludes a statement of the time, place and nature of public
rule-making proceedings," a reference to the legal author-
vate parties. Participants are often polarized and led to adopt extreme positions,
which results in further delays. Parties also tend to believe that the agency fa-
vored 'the other side' to its detriment. Moreover, agency officials resent, and feel
unreasonably constrained by, procedural requirements imposed by Congress and
the courts").
159. See lnfra note 332 and accompanying text.
160. See Mee, supra note 8, at 215.
161. Id.
162. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a).
163. Acton on Smoking and Health v. CAB., 699 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Liberty Homes, Inc v. Dept. of Industry, 401 N.W.2d 805 (Wis. 1987).
164. 5 U.S.C. §553(c).
165. 5 U.S.C. §553(b).
166. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(1).
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ity under which the rule is proposed,'67 and either the terms
or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved.' 6 During this stage, the pub-
lic is usually encouraged to provide the agency with written
comments on the concept of the rule. There is usually no
opportunity for public hearings during this stage of the pro-
cess.
The second opportunity for public input is during the
comment period. Some agencies are required to hold public
hearings, or do so as a matter of practice. These hearings,
or "workshops," are held to gain input on the proposed
rule. 69 Before a final rule is adopted, it is traditional for a
rule-making authority to hold a final hearing on the pro-
posed final rule. Some agencies actually have boards or
commissions with appointed members to hear and decide
on the final rule. Typically, after oral testimony is heard on
the matter, the board or commission debates the issues,
then votes on the rule. The voting process is not unlike a
typical legislative hearing, with amendments and motions
being proposed and voted on separately. After a rule is
adopted, the administrative agency must publish the final
rule in the Federal Register no less than 30 days prior to its
effective date.170
Depending upon the level of comment desired (or some-
times required 71 ), the intensity or extent of public partici-
pation can vary widely. The written testimony form or ar-
gument is employed most often."7 Most parties favor it
167. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(2).
'168. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(3).
169. A typical public workshop is more of a discussion rather than a hearing.
The EPA and the Department of Defense have used workshops that use similar
meeting agendas. The administrative staff will usually make a short presentation
outlining the issues facing the agency and the rationale for the proposed rule. If
necessary, the rule is broken down into separate issues or sections. Each section
is presented in further detail. Community representatives are encouraged to ask
questions and then are given an opportunity to present their ideas or objections
before the agency. The administrative staff will respond orally to the comments
and a dialogue will usually ensue. Sometimes if a rule or issue is extremely com-
plex, administrative agency officials will write "white papers" to analyze the issues
and present them in an easily comprehensible format. These white papers are of-
ten distributed before, during and after the meeting to community participants.
170. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d).
171. 5 U.S.C. § 556, 557.
172. Written testimony or comments are often sent to the administrative agency
during the public comment period. Sometimes the agency requires individuals
[Vol. 24:169
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because the decision-making process is not materially
slowed by the actual appearance of interested parties.
However, written testimony is sometimes not a practicable
form of communication for citizens who have limited time
and resources. In many cases, oral participation is the only
practicable method.
The purpose of public hearings depends upon the type of
decision being discussed and the legal requirements sur-
rounding the hearing. Ideally, public hearings are designed
to open the decision-making process to input from the pub-
lic so that decision-makers are better informed and edu-
cated about the potential impact of their decisions on inter-
ested members of the public. The information sharing
process of a public hearing also serves to help members of
the communities understand the rationale for agency proc-
esses and decisions. In a perfect world, everyone would
have his or her input incorporated or responded to in a
timely and considerate fashion. Unfortunately, due to time
and other practical considerations, not everyone is able to
participate. 7 3  Additional problems arise when multi-
cultural differences undermine the effectiveness of speech
even when opportunity is freely given.
IV. THEORETICAL AND PRAGMATICAL CONCERNS ABOUT
EXPANDED PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
A. Some Critical Theoretical Concerns
As noted above, the EPA continues to place heavy empha-
sis on environmental justice issues, but this emphasis ap-
pears in the form of guidance, rather than regulatory lan-
who wish to comment on a rule or proposed rule to submit their comments in
writing. This correspondence usually takes the form of a letter or a more formal
motion that suggests problems with the current rules and occasionally methods
for improvement. This method of communication obviously prohibits involvement
from individuals who are less than fully literate.
173. If a rule affected 50,000 people (which is not uncommon) and only half the
people were afforded the opportunity to testify before the administrative agency,
their comments would last seven and a half weeks, twenty-four hours a day (as-
suming each person spoke an average of three minutes). Furthermore, it would
take a full-time, 10-member staff 104 workdays to respond to these comments,
assuming It took them an average of 20 minutes to respond to each comment.
Logistically, it would be impossible for the government to demand those kinds of
resources of its taxpayers.
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guage.'74 The original language of the proposed rule re-
quired that both the facility and the permitting agency
make "all reasonable ,efforts" to communicate with various
segments of communities, particularly taking into account
multilingual differences between different communities."
Commentators expressed concerns that use of undefined
terms, including "all reasonable efforts," would lead to dis-
putes, controversy, and litigation. 6  EPA subsequently
eliminated the regulatory language requiring such efforts,
instead "encourag[ing] permitting agencies and facilities to
follow the spirit of [the proposed rule's language] and use
all reasonable means to ensure that all segments of the
population have an equal opportunity to participate in the
permitting process and have an equal access to information
in the process."' 77 Whether the modification from regulatory
language to policy directive through "guidance" and "en-
couragement" limits the effectiveness of the rule remains a
question.7 8 Racial discrimination and bias present in other
forms of participation, including traditional review-and-
comment rulemaking, could permeate the process, notwith-
standing the strong policy directive supporting environ-
mental justice. '7
174. See RCRA Rule, supra note 39, at 63240.
175. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 28.686. The requirements of the proposed rule were
particularly concerned with addressing communications problems with communi-
ties that do not use English as a primary language. EPA solicited comments on
the implementation of this regulatory language. Id. Commentators responded by
asking EPA to define several terms in the language, including "all reasonable ef-
forts," "significant," "non-English speaking," and "affected community." RCRA
Rule, supra note 39, at 63,420.
176. Id. These comments implicated conflicting concerns within the process.
Prolonged litigation and controversy creates a barrier to the entire process.
Stakeholders with greater resources will prevail because they will utilize their re-
sources to withstand these barriers. Greater public participation should stream-
line the process. Conversely, If these ambiguous terms will cause controversy and
litigation as regulatory language, similar concerns must rise when the same lan-
guage is applied in guiding principles and encouragement.
177. Id. EPA. in the RCRA Public Participation Manual, "strongly encourages"
such efforts to be made by facilities and permitting agencies. RCRA Manual, supra
note 37, at 2-19.
178. Clearly, regulatory language has a stronger effect on compliance with the
policy directive supporting advocacy of environmental justice in the RCRA permit-
ting process. Concern here is not whether EPA's guidance and encouragement is
an effective tool to promote environmental justice, but whether pragmatic con-
cerns found in each of the participation paradigms will limit the effectiveness of
such language. See Gauna, supra note 126, at 69.
179. See Id.
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Professor Eileen Gauna expressed concerns regarding use
of informal public participation avenues between the public
and the agencies. 8° Although this means of participation
can create potential for communication and reciprocal edu-
cation between the agency and the public,'8 ' Professor
Gauna found it contains hidden traps, especially for rela-
lively disempowered groups." Studies of informal proc-
esses, particularly of mediation processes, have revealed
substantial race and gender discrinination.' 83 One study
found that although ethnic minorities systematically lose in
mediation, they reported having a higher degree of satisfac-
tion with the process. 4 Another study found a similar at-
titude in the informal means of participation between citi-
zens and agency officials. The study concluded that the
majority of citizens felt positive about the meetings because
they were the best means to inform decision-makers, but at
the same time believed that the meetings did little to influ-
ence the outcome.'" Professor Gauna therefore suggests
that these informal means may have a deceptive appeal.'"
1. Continued Reliance on Expertise and the Synoptic
Model
Barriers found in the reliance on "expertise-ism" might
180. Id. at 67. 69. Although the Expanded Public Participation Rule includes an
informal process between the public and the facilities, Professor Gauna's concerns
remain applicable even in that context.
181. Id. at 67. Professor Gauna considers some of the potential practical appli-
cations of this means of participation, although she does not consider the informal
means of participation between the facility and the public. Facilities often meet
with the agency officials in an informal setting to discuss compliance and other
issues. Id. Similarly, communities should be able to meet with agency officials to
discuss potential risk and concerns. Id. Despite the concerns discussed here, the
preapplication meeting between the facility and the community does enhance this
means of participation, particularly because it creates two-way, informal commu-
nication between each of the stakeholders early in the process.
182. Id.
183. Id. Gauna cites two studies- one of retail car negotiations and another
involving mediated and adjudicated small claims cases- as examples of such dis-
crimination. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving, Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail
Car Negotiations, 104 HARv. L. REv. 817 (1991); Michelle Herman et al., The Metro-
court Project Final Report: A Study of the Effects of Ethnicity and Gender in Medi-
ated and Adjudicated Small Claims Cases x-xi (1993) (on file with the Stanford En-
vironmental Law Journal).
184. Id. at xl-xiii. See also Gauna, supra note 126, at 67-68.
185. Id. at 68.
186. Id.
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pervade these informal participation avenues.'87 Just as re-
liance on expertise infiltrates processes in more traditional
forms of participation,'M this reliance could encumber
strong policy encouraging environmental justice. In the
more extreme synoptic model of decision-making,189 profes-
sionals exchange information and then apply the informa-
tion to predetermined scientific principles to determine the
optimal decision."9 "Although synoptics are concerned with
187. See id. at 69. While these concerns will apply in informal meetings be-
tween the public and agency officials during the RCRA permitting process under
the expanded public participation rule, it is difficult to apply these concerns to the
preapplication meeting between the facilities and the public. Professor Gauna's
three concerns include (1) the technical orientation and overwhelming disparity in
resources could pervade the informal process in an unchecked manner, (2) envi-
ronmental justice advocates do not enter the informal process with independent
leverage and substantial technical resources, as do many industrial interests, and
(3) the agency official may lapse into the pluralistic mode of neutrality and par-
tially disregard the special interest asserted by the environmental justice advocate.
Id. The first and second concerns arise from "expertise-ism," a traditional reliance
on expertise, such as scientific insistence upon proof of adverse health effects or a
legal insistence upon proof of discriminatory intent. Id. The latter concern ad-
dresses the pluralistic operating principle, related to an antecedent belief in utili-
tarianism. Id. at 21. Each of these concerns is addressed here, in part, to raise
concerns with expanded public participation under the new RCRA regulations.
188. Professor Gauna's first concern with informal interaction between the
agency and the public is that the reliance on expertise will inhibit effective re-
sponse to the community's concerns. Id. at 69. Administrative decision-making
experienced a shift from expertise-ism to more open participation when concern
about the unfettered discretion of agencies forced the agencies to remain within
the boundaries of the legislative directive. Id. at 18. One commentator charac-
terized this shift in administrative decision-making from an emphasis on agency
expertise to inclusion of the regulated community as a bipolar struggle between
private rights of the regulated and the public welfare protected by the agency.
Stewart, supra note 134, at 1671-81 (1975); See also Gauna, supra note 126, at
18-19.
"Under this traditional view, the primary inquiry posed by legislation is the
permissible extent of governmental intrusion into the sphere of private autonomy,
it is the private interests that are at risk, not the public interest. Accordingly,
there is no role for the general public in agency proceedings. Despite a concern
about agency discretion, the ideal of formal expertise appears to dominate this bi-
polar structure. The regulated community's participation is allowed only to keep
agency expertise within the consensual boundary of the legislation in question."
Id. at 19.
189. This model of decision-making is also described as "comprehensive ration-
ality." See generaLly Colin S. Diver, Pblcymaking Paradigms in Administrative
Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 393, 396-99 (1981); Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican
Perspective on the National Environmental Policy Act's Process for Citizen Partcpa-
tion, 26 ENVr- L. 53 (1996).
190. Id. Synopticism ideally includes a four-step decision-making process: "(1)
the specification of a goal; (2) identification of all possible methods of obtaining
this goal; (3) the evaluation of the effectiveness of each method; and (4) the selec-
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the maximization overall social utility,""' they generally be-
lieve government professionals can best determine the
means by which to reach this goal. 92 Even under a less
extreme ideal of expertise, public participation is consistent
with this model of decision-making only if it conforms to the
scientific method.'93
Continued reliance on expertise, even with clear policy di-
rectives from EPA and the promulgation of the expanded
public participation rule, is not an unlikely occurrence.
Congress's policy involving environmental protection to
some degree furthers the synoptic cultural paradigm.' 94
This seems particularly true of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"). "'95 NEPA mandates Environ-
mental Impact Statements (EISs), which have produced a
large amount of citizen participation in environmental deci-
sion-making in the last two decades.'" Supporters also
tion of the alternative with the greatest progress toward the goal." Id. at 76. See
also Diver, supra note 189, at 396.
191. Synopticism is not generally associated with antecedent concepts of utili-
tarianism as is pluralism.
192. Poisner, supra note 189, at 57. Tasks assigned to the ideal synoptic deci-
sion-maker include unambiguous goal selection, reconciliation of numerous com-
peting objectives, cognizance of every possible means to attain the selected goal,
accurate comparison, and anticipation of every possible consequence. Diver, su-
prm note 189, at 396. See also Poisner, supra note 189, at 77, note 174. Poisner
notes true synopticism is clearly impossible. Id. "Only a superhuman decision-
maker could faithfully adhere to the ideal of comprehensive rationality." Diver,
supra note 189, at 396.
193. 1L See also Gauna, supra note 126, at 19.
194. See Poisner, supra note 189, at 78.
195. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d
(1994). Under NEPA, "AIII agencies of the Federal Government shall... utilize a
systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the
natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in
decision-making which may have an impact on man's environment." 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(A). See also Poisner, supra note 189. at 76. Professor Poisner, an advo-
cate of civic republicanism, discusses NEPA as it applied to other participation
paradigms, including synopticism and pluralism. He gives as examples of other
acts implementing a synoptic-model the National Forest Management Act of 1976
(NFMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994) and the Federal Land Policy and Man-
agement Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (1994). Id. at 78. Obvi-
ously, NEPA, along with NFMA and FLPMA, were enacted long before the environ-
mental justice movement had found its roots. However, the synoptic or expertise
model still prevails in some federal administrative acts, causing some degree of
concern about practical applicability of the environmental justice directive.
196. Poisner, supra note 189, at 55. See also Walter A. Rosenbaum, The Bu-
reaucracy and Environmental Policy, In ENVIRONMENrAL POIrriCS AND POUCY:
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 206, 229 (James P. Lester ed., 2d ed. 1995) (stating that
NEPA "appear[s] to be among the few public participation arrangements of the
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tout NEPA as a model of how federal environmental laws
allow for useful citizen input.97 However, from a synoptic
perspective, public participation serves only a narrow role:
information exchange."~
To the extent NEPA solicits citizen input, it serves to improve
the quality of information used by government decision mak-
ers. NEPA public participation takes the form of pseudo peer
review science, in which the agency uses public participation
to ensure that agency experts have, indeed, considered all the
relevant information.'9
In one sense, the expanded public participation rule, at
least from a policy perspective, expands this limited use of
public participation by contemplating a reciprocal exchange
of information between each of the stakeholders in the pro-
cess."° In another sense, even this enhanced model of in-
formation-exchange does not mandate agency officials to
engage in an equitable form of environmental decision-
making. An ideal exchange of information under the RCRA
regulations would lead to an educated public, a facility ap-
preciative of community concerns, and an enlightened per-
mitting agency. Nevertheless, even under this ideal ex-
change of information, decisions are left to the agency
officials themselves. A continued reliance on expertise,
even where the public has been educated, still raises con-
cern about disparity of resources.20 ' It is thus not unlikely
for citizens to leave the expanded public participation proc-
ess feeling better about the mode of participation, yet feel-
ing at the same time that their input did little to affect the
early 1970s with continuing vitality.")
197. Poisner, supra note 189, at 55.
198. Id. at 79 ("Foremost, NEPA serves as a means of providing information from
the government to the public."] See also Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (listing the purposes of NEPA,
including the transmission of agency information to the public but not the trans-
mission of public information to the agency).
199. Poisner, supra note 189, at 79 (internal citations omitted).
200. The expanded public participation under the RCRA regulations affects only
permitting hazardous waste sites. It is not clear whether these regulations will
affect citizen participation in other areas of environmental agency decision-
making. EPA's policy is to include environmental justice concerns in all aspects of
agency operations. Thus, it seems likely that the RCRA expanded public partici-
pation will have some effect on other arenas of environmental decision-making.
201. See Gauna, supra note 126, at 69.
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process."
It is doubtful whether the ideal exchange of informa-
tion- a reciprocal exchange between each of the
stakeholders- is possible. The agency and industrial in-
terests enter the process with considerably greater re-
sources and independent leverage than the average citizen
or citizen groupm3  Citizens can express views, perhaps
even add beneficial information, but the agency and indus-
trial interests will most likely possess resources most perti-
nent to the final decision. The communication process, at
one point, could easily become a one-way process: the
greater stakeholders first educate the public, then make the
final decision. Include in this model any biases or preju-
dices on the part of either the agency or the facility, and the
communication process breaks down.2° Moreover, difficul-
ties in recognizing multi-cultural differences in particular
communities, especially those communities in which a dis-
parity exists in the educational level of the citizens and
agency participants, makes the ability to address concerns
of citizens even more difficult.2 °5 In essence, citizens have a
greater opportunity to be included in a process that will fail
to address their concerns in the final outcome.
202. See icd. at 68. See also Ann Bray, Comment, ScLentific Decision-Makng: A
Barrier To Citizen Participation in Environmental Agency Decision Making, 17 WM.
MITCHELL L REV. 1111, 1133-34 (1991) (A Minnesota study found this attitude
among citizens in informal participation avenues between agency officials and the
general public).
203. See Gauna, supra note 126, at 69.
204. See Bray, supra note 202, at 1118-19 (noting that the scientific model of
agency decision-making relies on so-called "objective" data to avoid the appear-
ance of bias). See also Poisner, supra note 189, at 76.
205. EPA offers as guidance use of multilingual modes of communication in the
process. RCRA Manua, supra note 37, at 2-19, 2-20. However, EPA does not in-
clude in either its manual or the proposed regulation, guidance on how to educate
an "ignorant" public. The process may encourage education, but a community
with little understanding of the process or environmental law in general may
benefit little from such attempts to educate. These practical limitations which
make the expertise model so troublesome could easily pervade a process which
purports to include these citizens within the process. To this end, these concerns
could be applied to any model of participation which does not mandate inclusion
of public concerns in the process, beyond responses to comments by the permit-
ting agency. See RCRA Manual. supra note 37, at 3-19.
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2. "Lapses" Into the Pluralist Model.2°
The concerns concentrated on the expertise model apply
in part to the pluralist model of participation as well .
However, the pluralist model includes with it concerns over
the agency officials' role of neutrality" as parties with com-
206. This refers directly to Professor Gauna's third concern about informal par-
ticipation avenues. See Gauna, supra note 126, at 69. This subsection will briefly
explain pluralism and its application to the participation process related to the
concerns of environmental justice and the need to address multicultural differ-
ences in participants. Robert Dahl provided empirical support for pluralism's de-
scriptive claims, as administrative decision making experienced a shift from the
expertise model to the pluralist model. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE
UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1976); ROBERT A. DAHL, A
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?
DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CrrY (1961). See aLso Steven P. Croley,
Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COuiM. L. REV.
1, 31-32 (1998).
207. Pluralism refers generally to a theory whereby "private parties are the key
to understanding what public decision-makers do: Private parties form organized
interest groups in order to press their interests before office-holders and other
government officials." I& Concerns associated with expertise, particularly the
problems associated with disparity in resources, will still apply under the pluralist
theory. While the pluralist theory advocates equal qualification among all parties
in the process, the ultimate decision will still hinge to some degree (perhaps to a
great degree) on the resources the competing parties may utilize as they maximize
their own individual interests. See Poisner, supra note 189, at 56-57.
208. Pluralism is largely based on a belief of utilitarianism. Gauna, supra note
126, at 2 1. The pluralist model is "[girounded in the belief that one group's vision
of what Is best Is not inherently superior to another's..." Id. See also ROBERT A.
DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRrrlCS 31 (1989). All participants under this paradigm
stand on substantively equal footing. Gauna, supra note 126, at 2 1. Such con-
cepts- neutrality of the administrator and equal representation of all interests-
are conceptually utilitarian in nature. On the subject of equal representation of
interests, John Stuart Mill wrote:
"[Slociety between human beings, except in the relation of master and slave, Is
manifestly impossible on any other footing than that the interests of all are to be
consulted. Society between equals can only exist on the understanding that the
interests of all are to be regarded equally. And since in all states of civilization,
every person, except an absolute monarch, has equals, everyone is obliged to live
on these terms with somebody; and in every age some advance is made towards a
state in which it will be impossible to live permanently on other terms with any-
body. In this way people grow up unable to conceive as possible to them a state of
total disregard of other people's interests. They are under a necessity of conceiv-
ing themselves as at least abstaining from all the grosser injuries, and (if only for
their own protection) living in a state of constant protest against them. They are
also familiar with the fact of co-operating with others and proposing to themselves
a collective, not an individual, interest as the aim (at least for the time being) of
their actions. So long as they are co-operating, their ends identified with those of
others; there is at least a temporary feeling that the interests of others are their
own interests." JOHN STUART MILL, UTIITARIANISM 40 (Oskar Piest, ed. 1957).
"Agency neutrality is likewise a utilitarian concept. [Ilt is, by universal admis-
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peting interests participate in the decision-making proc-
ess.2' Pluralism itself was a response to limitations of the
expertise model of decision-making.1 ° However, pluralism
was not a means by which the public would necessarily
benefit from the process.2 ' One proffered benefit was pro-
tection of the general public from inadequate regulation.212
A second was protection of industry interests, as some
feared inclusion of the general public could lead agencies to
develop a bias "in favor of the organized interests of the
regulated."213 Pluralism recognizes the conflicting private
and subjective claims of each of the parties,2 4 but allows
sion, inconsistent with justice to be partial- to show favor or preference to one
person over another in matters to which favor and preference do not properly ap-
ply. Impartiality, however, does not seem to be regarded as a duty in itself, but
rather as instrumental to some other duty: for it is admitted that favor and prefer-
ence are not always censurable, and, indeed, the cases in which they are con-
demned are rather the exception than the rule. A person would be more likely to
be blamed than applauded for giving his family or friends no superiority in good
offices over strangers when he could do so without violating any other duty; and
no one thinks it is unjust to seek one person in preference to another as a friend,
connection, or companion. Impartiality where rights are concerned is of course
obligatory, but this is involved in the more general obligation of giving to every one
his right." Id. at 56.
209. See Poisner, supra note 189, at 80. MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE
GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 4-5 (1988) ('The process of making
public policy consisted of groups competing with one another for what legislators,
administrative agencies, and courts had to offer. The result of this group struggle
would be an aggregation or summating of group preferences in the way that elec-
tions sumrnated individual preferences.")
210. See Gauna, supra note 126, at 20-2 1.
211. See Id. at 19-20.
212. See Id. at 19. ("While agencies must be mindful of their non-
representational footing and of their place in political theory, they also must per-
form their duties by implementing legislation. Viewed in this light, just as the
regulated are protected from exuberant regulation, the public in general must be
protected against inadequate regulation.") A basis for pluralism is the "Lockean
presumption that individuals form society to protect their private interests in life,
liberty and property." Poisner, supra note 189, at 80. See aLso JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREAtiSES OF GOVERNMENT 287-96, 348-49 (Peter Laslette ed., 2d ed. 1967).
213. See Gauna, supra note 126, at 19. An explanation for this bias is that
agencies need the cooperation of the regulated communities to supply and develop
relevant information. It would be psychologically and organizationally difficult for
an agency to operate in an adversarial posture over an extended period of time,
since the regulated industry could drain agency resources by institution of formal
proceedings. I. See also Stewart, supra note 134, at 1675. In order to protect
against the risk of bias, *the expertise-oriented system had to change in order to
accommodate interests other than liberty and property interests of the regulated."
Guana, supra note 126, at 19-20. See also Stewart, supra note 134, at 1670.
214. See Poisner, supra note 189, at 80. ("[The private interests of life, liberty
and property] have at least two important characteristics. First, they are inher-
216 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 24:169
the preferences of the participants to stand on substan-
tively equal footing.2"5 The agency's role in the process is to
find the "common good"216 in the aggregation of the individ-
ual preferences.2
The model of pluralism is deceptive in its inclusion of all
stakeholder parties in the agency process.2 8 Pluralism al-
lows participation by all interested parties, but the pluralist
envisions political posturing and political bargaining within
these avenues of participation.1 9 Interest groups, including
ently subjective and therefore understood, as an exercise of private will, formed
outside the public sphere. As a consequence, pluralists are deeply skeptical of the
synoptic claim that experts can "objectively" ascertain an individual's interest.
Second, because pluralists believe that preferences are private and subjective, so-
ciety may not accord one individual's preferences greater weight than another's.")
(Internal citations omitted)
215. See Gauna, supra note 126, at 21 ("A strong pluralist conception blurs the
distinction between private and public interests, as public interests become mere
aggregated private preferences. The public interest in very clean air, for example,
would simply reflect the aggregated preferences for clean air by most people, a
preference not inherently superior to an alternative aggregated preference for un-
fettered automobile use and industrial activity resulting in severely polluted air.")
216. "Common good" relates to a key concept in utilitarianism, the "greatest
happiness principle," under which "the ultimate end, with reference to and for the
sake of all other things are desirable- whether we are considering our own good
or that of other people- is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and
as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality..." MuIL,
supra note 208, at 16. Conceptually, "common good" and "greatest happiness
principle"-- both generally generic concepts-- are based on aggregation of societal
preferences. Both, too, are perhaps conceptually unattainable. See id.; Poisner,
supra note 189, at 81. Any dichotomy, therefore, may be difficult to define. Utili-
tarianism in theory, however, focuses less directly on aggregation of "good" and
"bad* and more on attainment of greater societal "happiness," exempt from socie-
tal "pain." MILL, supra note 208, at 9. Likewise, actions are held "right" in pro-
portion as tending to promote happiness; they are "wrong" in their tendency to
promote and produce the reverse of happiness. I& at 10. Pluralist theory focuses
less upon the individual actions as being "right" and "wrong" and more upon the
aggregate interests of the community, although this aggregation of interests also
finds its roots in utilitarian concepts. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLAmON 3 (1948) ("The community is a fictitious
body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it
were its members. The interest of the community then is, what?- the sum of the
interests of the several members who compose it.")
217. See Poisner, supra note 189, at 81. One view of pluralism finds no public
interest or "common good," "just private interests forming an overall social utility."
Id. at 57. See aLso Gauna, supra note 126, at 21.
218. The use of public hearings, public comment, and associated political fights
in the process, including the process in the RCRA Expanded Public Participation
Rule, arise from the use of the pluralist model in decision-making. See Poisner,
supra note 189, at 84 (Under NEPA. these avenues for participation "serve to make
explicit the previously ignored resource clashes.")
219. Id. Expanse of public participation relates to some degree to the enact-
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industrial and environmental interest advocates, exert
much of the political pressure within the process.2 Such
advocacy is appropriate "because those interests are con-
tained within expression of preferences embodied in legis-
lation.""' Thus, if neither barriers to participation exist nor
undue influence by one stakeholder in the process is ex-
erted, interest group advocacy remains acceptable.'m The
agency assumes the role of mediator in the process, re-
maining neutral as the interest groups vie for political posi-
tion.223 It is not necessary for an agency to consider all ethi-
cal claims of interested parties. Instead, unrestrained
inclusion is necessary only to ensure the ideal array of pref-
erences vying to assert group preferences in a "surrogate" or
supplemental political process." Such "preference-
pushing" effectively demarcates the ability of the agency to
ment of the APA, which allowed for citizen involvement in the process. Id. at 82.
As public participation increased, environmentalists used citizen participation "as
a strategy to restructure the power relationships involved in agency decision-
making." Id. at 84. These environmentalists' goal, through bargaining with other
interests over the use of natural resources, was a level political playing field. Id&
220. See Gauna, supra note 126, at 22. See also Poisner, supra note 189, at 57
(describing pluralism as a "constellation of essentially private interests, instead of
competing in the economic market, using political pressure to influence the final
decision or vying for interpretive superiority over statutes.")
221. Gauna, supra note 126, at 22-23.
222. Id. at 23.
223. Id. ("[Ain agency structure that accommodates pluralist ideals is one that
is accessible to representatives of all legitimate interests and one that requires of-
ficials to maintain a relative neutrality towards interest groups and legislatively
expressed preferences. Under this conceptions, the agency is not a preference
generator, but a preference mediator.")
224. Commentators often refer to decision-making in the pluralist model as a
"surrogate political process." See, e.g., Id. at 25. Central to the pluralist model is
inclusion of interested parties within the process, much like inclusion of the pub-
lic through elections, interest group advocacy and other means of public interven-
tion in the legislative process. See Roger Crampton, The Why, Where and How of
Broadened Public Participaton in the Admlrnistratve Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525, 531
(1972) (arguing that agency participation should attempt to duplicate the pluralist
legislative process). Reforms within the administrative process under the pluralist
model included other concepts more traditionally associated with the legislative
process, including the formalization of the rulemaking record to allow for later ju-
dicial review, and limitations on ex parte communication. Poisner, supra note
189, at 82. However. Professor Gauna suggests that environmental decision
making today, with public hearings, notice-and-comment requirements for rule-
making procedures, and other mechanisms intended to promote equal access and
footing for all stakeholders in the process, creates something of a supplemental
political process. Gauna. supra note 126. at 25. This supplemental political proc-
ess refines group preferences by allowing an acceptable degree of "preference
pushing" by interest groups. Id. at FN86.
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address the multicultural differences of its participants225 or
take into consideration ethical claims of environmental jus-
tice advocates.
2 6
Addressing multicultural differences in the pluralist
model places the. agency in a peculiar role. The utilitarian
framework requires the agency official to be a strictly im-
partial mediator between opposing parties, including par-
ties of different ethnic backgrounds.227 Eliminating cultural
barriers requires some degree of proactive or affirmative ac-
tion 228 on the part of the agency to assure sufficient com-
munication on the part of each side. While the agency may
do so and maintain, to some extent, its neutrality, the proc-
ess of creating meaningful inclusion of minorities becomes
a process within a process. 229 The agency must first adopt
an approach conducive to effective interaction between par-
ties of different ethnic cultures or groups representing these
225. Seemingly lost in the shuffle of participation paradigms are pragmatic con-
cerns such as meaningful inclusion of groups beyond mere policy directives call-
ing for "equal access" and "equal participation." The question of who participates
must shift to how they are able to participate.
226. Environmental justice advocacy, although related to the concerns of al-
lowing meaningful participation by people of color, finds its limits in asserting Its
preferences within the process. Professor Gauna deems environmental justice a
"misfit" in each participation paradigm, including the expertise, pluralist, and civic
republican models. Gauna, supra note 126, at 51.
227. In a truly utilitarian framework, every party would act to create the maxi-
mization of happiness of all concerned. See MILL, supra note 208, at 22 ("Mhe
happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not
the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happi-
ness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a
disinterested and benevolent spectator.")
228. This does not suggest that the agency should be partial to the concerns of
the minority groups. It does, however, suggest that the agency must take action
not only to encourage meaningful inclusion of minority groups but also to con-
tinue efforts assuring that the participation platform is equal for all parties. In
this sense, some degree of deference must be given to minority groups that have
been long excluded from the process and that lack the resources and political in-
fluence to engage effectively in it.
229. It might be said with certainty that any form of governmental decision-
making is a multi-level process. The two processes described here, however
seemingly related, do not exist in a parallel structure, as it would seem. The
agency throughout the decision-making procedures must assure that minorities
are offered meaningful inclusion. The agency must serve a dual function as me-
diator as well, by also concentrating its efforts on the final solution to the problem.
In the pluralist model, this dual function creates an unusual role for the agency.
After it assures inclusion of one party throughout the process, It must then
maintain its neutral role, addressing the very input it encouraged through partici-
pation while considering it on neutral terms with the preferences of all other inter-
ested groups.
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cultures. Successful interaction requires mutual under-
standing of inherent differences between the groups distinct
from the interests these groups represent within the deci-
sion-making process itself. The approach adopted by the
RCRA Expanded Public Participation Rule seems to encour-
age this mutual understanding by requiring the informal
meeting between the community and the applicant facil-
ity.23  However, the process after this initial meeting to a
large degree follows the pluralist model,23 ' in which the par-
ties involved are adversaries. 2
Should the expanded public participation process remain
pluralist in practice, it could easily undermine the positive
gains achieved by the initial meeting between the facility
and the public. Efforts between the parties appear, on the
surface, to be cooperative. The process is undermined,
however, if and when a party undertakes to hold or advance
its political position, even if that party continues its efforts
to cooperate with the other party. 3 Whether the process is
undermined under the new rule is only a consideration.
The agency is in the best position to assure such activities
will not occur.234 At the same time, it is the agency that will
230. See RCRA Rule, supra note 39, at 63,422. EPA "anticipate[s] that the ap-
plicant and the public will share ideas, educate each other, and start building the
framework for a solid working relationship."
231. The RCRA rule does not appear to veer from other areas of environmental
decision-making, with the exception of the preapplication meeting between the
public and the permitting agency. Much of environmental decision-making today
operates within the pluralistic structure, "advancing utility maximization by agen-
cies that provide opportunities for representation of recognized interests while
maintaining agency neutrality." Gauna, supra note 126, at 25.
232. EPA's ideal interaction between stakeholders is one of cooperation
throughout each stage of the decision-making process. See RCRA Rule, supra
note 39, at 63,422. However, even in a cooperative atmosphere, stakeholders will
advocate opposite positions. Should cooperative efforts fail, reversion to the ad-
versarial nature of the permitting process is not an unlikely result, considering the
process still contains methods found in the pluralist structure. Professor Gauna's
concern about an agency official's "lapse" into a pluralist mode of neutrality be-
comes applicable to the RCRA permitting process as well. See Gauna, supra note
126, at 69.
233. The party, which could undermine the process, could be any interest
group, including an environmental justice advocacy group. On the other hand, it
seems more likely the party engaging in political posturing would be the party
with the greater political position. Between the applicant facility and the commu-
nity, the facility seems more likely to be the party engaging in such activity.
234. Although EPA did not suggest one party would undermine the process, its
guidance includes methods for allowing the parties to maintain cooperation
throughout the process. See RCRA Rule, supra note 39, at 63,419.
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dictate whether the parties will posture themselves as ad-
versaries under the pluralism model or whether the partici-
pation under the new RCRA rule forgoes such an adversar-
ial system altogether.' Should the former occur, it is
questionable whether the agency will be able to maintain
the cooperative atmosphere given its traditional neutral role
in the utilitarian framework found in the pluralist model.
3. A Purview of Utilitarian Considerations
To some extent, successful inclusion of minorities into the
decision-making process does conform to the theoretical
utilitarian concept.2" The ideals of utilitarian morality are
found in the Christian proverbs, "to do as you would be
done by," and "to love your neighbor as yourself."2" As a
means to achieve this ideal, Mill suggested:
[U]tility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements
should place the happiness or (as, speaking practically, it
may be called) the interest of every individual as nearly as
possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and, sec-
ondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a
power over human character, should so use that power as to
establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble as-
sociation between his own happiness and the good of the
whole .... 238
235. EPA's rule- and perhaps no administrative or legislative directive- follows
a model for its course of conduct. More accurately, the system is a myriad of vari-
ous models. In one sense, the final outcome is strengthened by successful use of
these models. At the same time, quite obvious and perhaps over-simplified, use of
these paradigms opens the dangers found within the models. EPA stressed flexi-
bility in the process to utilize local solutions to ensure equal opportunity for all
parties to participate. See IL at 63,420-21. Central to this flexibility is allowing
local actors- facility owners, state environmental agencies, tribes and private citi-
zens- to determine which modes of communication and participation will work
best for a particular community. Id While flexibility is key to effective participa-
tion, it also perhaps allows traditional roles of the parties to permeate the process.
The agency must 'steer the course" of the agenda to maintain the cooperative and
flexible atmosphere.
236. Application of utilitarian theory serves as some basis to illustrate the ap-
plicability of inclusion within the pluralist model. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1544 (1988) (stating that "[miuch of the
appeal of pluralism stems from its connection with utilitarianism.') It would be,
however, far-fetched to attempt to incorporate the utilitarian theory as the plural-
ist theory, since the latter only incorporates appropriate ideals from the former.
rather than incorporate it as a foundational doctrine.
237. Matthew 7:12; 5:43,19:19,22:39 (King James).
238. Miu., supra note 208, at 22.
[Vol. 24:169
1999] Multicultural Participation In Public Hearing Process 221
Application of this ideal in the modem administrative
structure (albeit an oblique application) allows inclusion of
minority groups for the very reason considered by Mill.
While the minority interest should be placed in harmony
with the aggregate interests of all stakeholders- and soci-
ety in general- the process should create in the mind of
the minority an association between her or his own interest
and the interests of society as a whole. It may be argued
that it exacts too high a duty to require that the minority
will act to promote the general interests of society.239 Yet
Mill's response to this very charge against utilitarianism
remains applicable even in this context.
It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or
by what test we may know them; but no system of ethics re-
quires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of
duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our ac-
tions are done from other motives, and rightly so done if the
rule of duty does not condemn them.?
A minority group advocating environmental justice un-
doubtedly acts to further its own motive.24 A minority
group may advocate environmental justice concerns, so
long as the benefit of environmental justice does not induce
the "pain" contemplated by utilitarianism, 242 or extend to
239. The exact criticism was offered by opponents of utilitarianism. See icL at
23. A similar argument might be made that minorities in the modern administra-
tive context are not voicing their interests in the interest of morality.
240. Id Mill continues by noting,
"[Hie who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right,
whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble; he who be-
trays a friend that trusts him is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve an-
other friend to whom he is under greater obligations. But to speak only of actions
done from the motive of duty, and in direct obedience to principle: it is a misap-
prehension of the utilitarian mode of thought to conceive it as implying that peo-
ple should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at
large.- I. at 24-25.
241. I note "without question" because environmental justice is a collective "self-
interest," although it is not a preference-grounded utilitarian "rational" self-
interest. See Gauna, supra note 126, at 46. In the pluralist concept, the admin-
istrative arena is composed of parties acting to further their own motives, with a
neutral administrator taking these motives and self-interests (or preferences) into
consideration to find the greatest social utility.
242. It is difficult to associate the utilitarian concept of "pain" in the environ-
mental context without including the more concrete vision of "pain" experienced
through environmental injustice. Nevertheless, societal pain, as it is contemplated
in utilitarian theory, would also include the pain suffered by others if alternatives
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violate the legitimate expectations of anyone else.2" Other
interest groups may advocate their positions, so long as
their interests advocate the greater collective social utility. 2"
Ideally, minority concerns, particularly environmental jus-
tice concerns, comprise a collective value to be taken into
consideration to maximize the overall social utility.
24
The reality of incorporation of environmental justice advo-
cacy in the utilitarian framework falls far short of the
ideal.2 1 Environmental justice presents a potentially in-
compatible variable to the utilitarian approach to decision-
making.247 Wealth maximization can be considered instru-
to environmental decisions are pursued. To illustrate, if an industry interest pro-
poses a hazardous waste site in a primarily African-American community, the
pain is suffered by the community. The utility of the project is found in the dis-
posal of hazardous wastes and the use of mechanisms that create the hazardous
waste. Alternatively, if placing the hazardous waste site is not permitted, the pain
suffered is the same utility created by its placement: society gains less from the
mechanisms which create the waste, and the hazardous waste may potentially
remain indisposed. The utility of non-placement, or the happiness it creates, is
limited to the community that is free from the hazardous waste site. Likewise, if
the site were placed in another community, the same pain felt by the African-
American community would be felt in the other community. Utilitarianism re-
quires the African-American community to consider the pain felt by others if the
site fails to be constructed, taking into consideration the morality of the action if
the site is not built or built in another community.
243. See MILL, supra note 208, at 25 ("The great majority of good actions are
intended not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the
good of the world is made up.... ")
244. This very statement makes environmental justice advocacy impossible to
align in a utilitarian framework. Three general alternatives exist- (1) placing the
site in the minority community (2) do not place the site at all, and (3) placing the
site in another community. If the collective preferences are for (2) and (3) not to
occur, then to avoid (1) means to avoid collective preference. Even if environ-
mental justice is served, it is by some other justification than a utilitarian's. Even
utilitarians often must go outside of utilitarianism to seek solutions where a great
number of people will feel the pain of an action. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSICE 54 (1981).
245. See Gauna, supra note 126, at 46. Equitable environmental protection is a
bona fide collective value, but as Professor Gauna explains, it is not a preference
grounded in the utilitarian framework.
246. Professor Gauna offers a detailed and illustrated application of the utili-
tarian concept of decision-making with respect to environmental justice. See id. at
36-47. Her analysis is, in part, summarized here.
247. Id at 39-40. Professor Gauna finds that viewing some values, such as a
clean environment, as a utilitarian preference presents special problems. She of-
fers the following illustration: "An ecosystem could be protected because it would
be economically efficient to do so. Alternatively, an ecosystem could be protected
because it would maximize our overall happiness when taking into consideration
our sentiment towards the environment. A third alternative is that an ecosystem
could be protected because it is ethically 'the right thing to do.' Regulation will
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mental to utility maximization, if one assumes the things
that make wealth possible are major ingredients in people's
happiness.'" Following this assumption, environmental
justice is not included in a more general mix of aggregated
preferences.2 "9
If what we want is environmental protection on the cheap,
then the best way to achieve it is through injustice. It is more
economical to place environmental risk-generating activities
in areas where land is cheaper and where the residents,
lacking political influence, are less likely to successfully op-
pose [sic] the siting.250 After siting, fines for noncompliance
are likely to be lower in low income communities and com-
251
munities of color. Moreover, if the area is subsequently
contaminated, listing on the National Priorities List (NPL)
takes longer and clean-up requirements are likely to be less
stringent in poor, racial minority and ethnic communities.5 2
It appears, then, that environmental inequity is economically
efficient, at least over the short run. As such, inequity could
be viewed as a preference inherent in utilitarianism.
differ in kind and degree depending upon the reason for protecting the ecosystem."
Id. at 38-39.
Professor Gauna finds that environmental values can fit within a utilitarian
framework, which accounts for non-economic preferences. Id. at 38-39 Value can
be placed on non-economic preferences of traditional environmental concerns. Id.
In this sense, the value may be measured using a cost-benefit approach. Envi-
ronmental justice adds a peculiar level of complexity. Id. at 39. The utilitarian
may question the utility of environmental justice, or may find it difficult to -meas-
ure its value in economic terms. Id.
248. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 12-13 (4th ed. 1992).
See also Gauna, supra note 126, at 40.
249. Id.
250. Professor Gauna cites a stunning finding about the citing of hazardous
waste sites in lower socioeconomic areas. Id. A 1984 report prepared for the
California Waste Management Board found that all socioeconomic groups resent
siting major facilities in their communities, but that the middle and upper socio-
economic strata possess the better resources to oppose the siting successfully.
The report then advised that hazardous waste facilities should be sites more than
five miles from middle and high economic strata neighborhoods. J. Stephen Pow-
ell, Cerrell Assocs.. Political Difficulties Facing Waste to Energy Conservation Plant
Siting: Report to the California Waste Management Board 42-43 (1984) (on file with
the Stanford Environmental Law Journal). Moreover, the report recommended
that officials and companies should look for lower economic neighborhoods to site
the facility. Id. See also Gauna, supra note 126, at 40.
251. See Marcia Coyle et al., Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environ-
mental Law, NAYL L.J.. Sept. 21, 1992. at S4, S7.
252. See Id. at S2.
253. Gauna, supra note 126, at 40-41.
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An attempt to reconcile environmental equity with the
utilitarian approach finds the greater short-term cost diffi-
cult considering the utilitarian ideal of efficiency.2" To
some degree, costs and benefits of environmental equity
can be calculated. 5 Nevertheless, "[e]nvironmental justice
challenges reside in an ethical dimension beyond utility,
and this is the central reason why environmental justice
cannot be fully integrated into environmental regulation as
it currently exists."' Whether using the utilitarian ap-
proach to decision-making or a cost-benefit analysis25 be-
254. Id. at 43. Professor Gauna underwent an analysis attempting to reconcile
the preference for environmental equity with the utilitarian approach, recognizing
that "most would agree upon the existence of a collective desire for systematically
equitable environmental protection for all despite its short-term economic ineffi-
ciency." Id. at 41.
255. Although these costs and benefits can be calculated, other environmental
amenities, which have a utilitarian component that can be measured, lose in the
cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 37-39, 46. One concept includes "demoralization
costs" associated with environmental inequity, which include disabilities including
social unrest and impaired incentives, stemming from the perceived unfairness.
See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Fbundatlons of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1214-15 (1967).
See also Gauna, supra note 126, at 42-45. An alternative approach would be to
attempt to value the psychic benefit of an ethical distribution under the traditional
"willingness to pay" approach, although this would be more expensive. Id. at 45.
See also POSNER, supra note 248, at 12. However, "it would be extraordinarily dif-
ficult, however, to devise a survey that could adequately capture the true willing-
ness of individuals to pay for environmental justice, especially since payment
could potentially include forcing lifestyle changes on those being surveyed who live
in wealthier, predominately white neighborhoods." Gauna, supra note 126, at 45.
256. Id. at 46. Environmental justice's incompatibility extends even further-
and becomes more acute- 'when one considers the potential for the ethical man-
date to destabilize existing resolutions of conflicting utilities. For example, the
regulation of hazardous waste facilities results in extraordinary costs to the waste
industry, which are then passed on to disposers and ultimately to consumers.
These costs already have been weighed against our collective concern about the
disposal of hazardous waste and the risk involved in their disposal. In other
words, the utility of hazardous waste has been balanced against the utility of rea-
sonable safety. The result is a substantial increase in the costs of disposal in ex-
change for better (although not risk-free) hazardous waste management.. .The
resulting trade-off has also resulted in the eventual disproportionate location of
hazardous waste facilities and abandoned waste sites in communities of color."
Id. at 46-47.
257. Disparity between costs and benefits would be even more acute in a
monetized version of a cost-benefit analysis, where the various benefits and costs
of a project are reduced to monetary sums and then aggregated. See Matthew
Adler. IncommensurabilIty and Cost-Benefit Analysis. 146 U. PA, L. REV. 1371
(1998). When the total monetized costs (particularly the short-terms costs of
achieving environmental equality) are subtracted from the total monetized benefits
(which are difficult, if not impossible, to scale to a monetary value), the costs will
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yond the utilitarian approach, environmental justice advo-
cates will systematically lose because of the great disparity
between the benefit of environmental equity and the cost of
achieving environmental equity. Given this consideration,
the likelihood that environmental justice advocates will lose
even with expanded public participation in the RCRA proc-
ess seems to double. First, the danger of an agency "lapse"
into the pluralist model, with its utilitarian underpinnings,
leaves the agency unequipped to address the purely ethical
claims of the environmental justice advocate. 258 Second, the
agency is likely to apply a cost-benefit analysis before
making its final decision," the result of which will generally
show that the environmental justice claim is not economi-
cally efficient.'
The potential failure to incorporate environmental justice
concerns in regulation even with expanded public partici-
pation is not offered to condemn efforts of the EPA to ex-
pand participation in its decision-making process.26' Short-
most likely exceed any monetary benefit achieved from the project. See Id.;
Gauna, supra note 126, at 46.
258. The ability to respond to ethical values finds its difficulty in economic
analysis, as discussed by proponents of the law and economics movement. See k.
For example, Judge Posner notes "efficiency [denoting] allocation of resources in
which value is maximized, has limitations as an ethical criterion of social decision-
making. Utility in the utilitarian sense also has grave limitations [in part] because
it is difficult to measure when willingness to pay is jettisoned as a metric."
POSNER, supra note 248, at 13.
259. See Adler, supra note 257, at 1371-72. The agency is required by executive
order to undergo a cost-benefit analysis. In 1981, President Reagan issued an ex-
ecutive order enjoining federal agencies that "[rlegulatory action.., not be un-
dertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the
potential costs to society." Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2(b). 3 C.F.R. 127, 128
(1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3
C.F.R. 638 (1994). reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994). In 1993, President Clinton
replaced the Reagan order, but retained the central requirement that a project's
benefits outweigh its costs. Exec. Order 12,866 § 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639
(1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (l[ejach agency shall.., propose or
adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs.")
260. See supra note 254. Agencies are required to submit reports detailing costs
and benefits to the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"). See Id. OMB re-
quires "[tlo the fullest extent possible, benefits and costs should be expressed in
discounted dollars." Office of Management & Budget, Economic Analysis of Fed-
eral Regulations under Executive Order 12,866, at pt. IIIA2 (1996).
261. Quite obviously, addressing multicultural differences within the process
would have no bearing if expanded public participation were rendered useless by
previous failures in the system.
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comings found in participation models2 "2 will not necessarily
re-arise in the new regulation, but the EPA must make as-
surances that these shortcomings do not permeate the
strides the agency has made with the new rule. It is for this
reason that the use of guiding principles and encourage-
ment must be questioned.2 6 Can the agency rise to some
level above rigid measurement of costs and benefits to find
true equality in regulatory outcomes? More importantly,
can the agency not only encourage participation but also
ensure that the voice of a minority community has a
meaningful effect, allowing the agency to achieve environ-
mental equality?26
B. Transition to Some Pragmatical Considerations
The answers to these questions are not found in theory
but in practice. Environmental justice cannot be achieved
without the encouragement of the minorities to enter the
process uninhibited by participation barriers. Expanding
public participation achieves this step. Yet many of the en-
vironmental justice concerns raised within the agency pro-
ceeding will be raised by the minorities themselves, groups
who are not advocates with an understanding .of model
agency decision-making. The agency must understand that
what the minority brings before the committee will be real-
life experience, perhaps foreign to the traditional input pro-
262. Recognizing that the synoptic and pluralist models are more archaic than
contemporary theories of regulation, I do not offer them as leading theories of the
modem administrative system. More modem theories include, but are not limited
to. the public choice theory (a critical response to pluralism, it analogizes regula-
tory decision-making to market decision-making), the neopluralist theory (an off-
spring of the pluralist theory, it foresees interest-group competition, but seeks to
correct imbalances within this competition), and the public interest theory (argu-
ing that regulatory outcomes ameliorate market failures). For each of these theo-
ries and a critical response to them, see Croley, supra note 206, at 31-86. A
fourth theory, modem civic republicanism, is discussed infta.
263. See supra note 178.
264. I must reiterate the failure of economic and legal theorists to postulate a
cost-benefit analysis in favor of ethical concerns. See supra note 254. This con-
sideration creates serious doubt whether an agency could conduct such a favor-
able analysis when no theorist has been able to do so.
265. This question introduces the "next step" in meaningful inclusion. Ex-
panding public participation invites inclusion, but it does not guarantee such in-
clusion will have any bearing on the process. No model of participation can guar-
antee this participation will be meaningful, but other methods may be more
appropriate to incorporate minorities within the administrative system.
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vided in this forum. Reliance on bureaucratic expertise, not
in a theoretical sense but in a practical sense, will render
input by minorities useless. Likewise, decision-making
through political bargaining fails because the input pro-
vided by minorities is not intended as an assertion of bar-
gaining power. However, before reaching the conclusion
that the RCRA rule is incompatible with any model of par-
ticipation, expanded public participation must be analyzed
under a third model of participation, modem civic republi-
canism.
1. Civic Republicanism Ideals and the RCRA Rule
While the RCRA permitting process retains aspects of the
expertise and pluralist models of public participation, ef-
forts to expand public participation in the process is con-
sistent with an "experiment"266 in democracy. EPA's policy
statements and guidelines seem to indicate a shift in direc-
tive to a decentralization process whereby communities play
a much larger role in the decision process.267 For example,
OSWER endorses community-based environmental protec-
tion ("CBEP"), a method of solving environmental problems
in the context of the community in which they occur.2 8
Ideally, the community will cooperate, communicate, pro-
vide feedback, and become an integral part of the process.26
Also, the group discussion will create a flood of alternatives
the agency may take into account.27 0 However, particularly
266. "Democratic Experimentalism," recognized and discussed in detail by Pro-
fessors Michael C. Doff and Charles F. Sabel, concentrates on a new form of gov-
ernment, where "power is decentralized to enable citizens and other actors to util-
ize their local knowledge to fit solutions to their individual circumstances, but in
which regional and national coordinating bodies require actors to share their
knowledge with others facing similar problems." See Michael C. Doff & Charles F.
Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Expermentalism, 98 CoLUM. L. REV. 267
(1998). Other commentators have noted the "experiment" in democracy where the
agencies' doors are opened and public participation is encouraged and/or re-
quired. See Poisner, supra note 189, at 53-54.
267. See RCRA Manual, supra note 37. at 2-21.
268. See id. OSWER's plan points to CBEP as a method that "brings the gov-
ernment closer to the people it is meant to serve." It also heralds CBEP as "a new
way of accomplishing traditional tasks in a more effective, more responsive man-
ner."
269. See id.
270. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 266, at 302. ("Group discussion of problems
renders the resulting flood of alternatives tractable. Group discussion meets and
immediate objection to the problem solving through extensive collaboration rather
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because the ultimate decision remains in the hands of the
agency, the question of whether the participation is mean-
ingful remains unresolved."'
The modem civic republican model of democratic partici-
pation is less concerned with the decentralization process
described above and more concerned with advocating a de-
liberative decision-making process, designed to reach a goal
of the "common good."272 Civic republicanism is a "constel-
lation of beliefs centered around 1) the existence and le-
gitimacy of public values and the common good, 2) the use
of citizen deliberation as the principal democratic decision-
making tool, and 3) the state's legitimate role in fostering
civic virtue among its citizens."" Advocates of this model of
government believe it allows citizens to work together to
create a common good for the community.2 4 Of particular
interest in the context of addressing multicultural differ-
than hierarchical decomposition of tasks: the geometric explosion of pairwise
contacts that such collaboration might seem to entail. If A must consult first with
B, then with C, and the latter two must then meet by themselves, the sheer num-
ber of consultations is unmanageable unless the group is minuscule. If, however.
the collaborators meet together- a possibly, strikingly, not contemplated in the
theories of bounded rationality- one meeting substitutes for many.")
271. See Poisner, supra note 189, at 54. Professor Poisner notes "Administra-
tors must listen to citizens. But what are they to do with the information they
hear?"
272 See ic. The goal of "common good" differentiates the goal of most propo-
nents of civic republicanism from the values found in the expertise (or synoptic) or
pluralist model, which centers on aggregate private preferences. The "common
good" often refers to the concept of public values. See id. at 58. Public values"
have been defined as goals of intentions that people ascribe to the group or com-
munity of which they are members, such values are theirs because they believe
and argue that they should be theirs; people pursue these values not as individu-
als but as members of the group. They then share with other members of their
community inter-subjective intentions or, to speak roughly, common goals and
aspirations, and it is by virtue of these that a group or community is a group or
community. MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 14 (1988).
273. Poisner, supra note 189, at 56. See also Symposium, The Republican Civic
Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). Professor Poisner describes deliberative ideal
by distinguishing it from the models of synopticism and pluralism, described su-
pro. Pluralists and synoptics, while disagreeing as to what mode of decision mak-
ing best aggregates individual interests, share a core belief that such maximiza-
tion of aggregate individual utility provides the goal of government policy. Civic
republican advocates of deliberation, in contrast, do not believe that individual
utility, however aggregated, can entirely capture the range of goals appropriately
pursued by a democratic society. Community, from the civic republican perspec-
tive, denotes not just a collection of individuals, but a set of relationships that can
give rise to goals not capable of being expressed in individual terms. I& at 57-58.
274. Id. at 58.
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ences and attaining the goal of environmental justice is the
concept of "creating" the common good through delibera-
tion. As Professor Poisner describes,
According to the advocates of deliberation, public values de-
velop through the deliberative process.27 5 During delibera-
tion, citizens reason together about what course of action
would promote the common good. The "creative" aspect of
deliberation must be emphasized. Advocates of deliberation
do not believe that the common good is "out there" to be
"found" through dialogue. Public values do not stem from a
pre-existing consensus that one need only discover. 2 76 Nor
can one find public values through some form of abstract
moral reasoning. 27 Rather, public values are 'forged through
the act of public participation, created through common de-
liberation and common action and the effect that deliberation
and action have on interests, which change shape and direc-
tion when subjected to these participatory processes.'2 7 8 Or,
put another way, civic republicans believe that citizens create
the common good through discourse.2 79
In many ways civic republicanism seems suited to incor-
porating ethnic minorities into its process. Required of citi-
zens in the deliberation ideal is the concept of civic virtue,
which presupposes that citizens will reason together about
a common interest, "rather than just using speech as a
strategy."' Clearly, such mutual reasoning requires more
effective interaction between groups of citizens of different
cultural backgrounds, but civic virtue requires additional
considerations for effective interaction. The civic virtue
necessary relies on a mutual respect between citizens.28'
The process is a "search" for the common good, and citizens
275. SeeSunstein, supra note 236, at 1548-51.
276. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, SMONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY Pourncs FOR A
NEw AGE (1984).
277. See BENJAMIN R BARBER, THE CONQUEST OF POLTICS: LIBERAL PHILOSOPHY IN
DEMOCRATIC TIMES 203 (1988).
278. See Sunstein, supra note 275, at 1545.
279. Poisner, supra note 189, at 59-60.
280. I at 61. See also Suzanna Sherry, Without Virtue There Can Be No Lib-
erty, 78 MINN. L. REV. 61, 69 (1993); BARBER, supra note 277, at 200-201 ("in as-
suming the mantle of citizenship, the I becomes We. This transformation natu-
rally requires an understanding of citizenship more vigorous and mutualistic than
the one favored by modem social scientists, which identifies citizens as private
agents pursuing private interests in a political marketplace.")
281. Poisner, supra note 189, at 62.
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are required to understand differences in each other, not
only multi-cultural differences. 82
It is worth emphasizing this respect engenders more than
mere "tolerance" of the other, but rather, a recognition that as
co-citizens people participate in an interdependent relation-
ship with each other that demands an initial willingness to
listen respectfully to each other in the deliberative process.283
EPA policy language in the RCRA Expanded Participation
program contains some concepts identified with civic re-
publicanism. Two are worth emphasizing. First, the ex-
pansion of participation avenues in the pre-application
stage, where the applicant and the community meet infor-
mally, encourages the type of mutual reasoning and respect
advocated by civic republicans. The most important goal,
according to EPA, is to encourage dialogue between the ap-
plicant and the community in the initial stage of the proc-
ess.' Were EPA, through expanded public participation, to
attain a goal of deliberation (assuming a deliberative ideal
would be desirable for enhancing multicultural participa-
tion), this stage would be the ideal point for this mutuality
of reasoning and respect to begin.2 Second, communica-
tion within the process, under RCRA, is designed to en-
courage a "feedback loop" between the stakeholders in the
process.' Civic republicans likewise advocate a form of
"feedback loop," not only allowing mutuality in information-
sharing and understanding, but also allowing the citizens
themselves to become more effective participants in the
process."7 Some commentators have noted that feelings of
282. Id. at 62-63. ("Citizens must acknowledge each other's different perspec-
tives in the deliberative process. Only through such a respectful relationship can
discussion ever hope to mediate people's differences in a search for the common
good.")
283. Id. at 63. See also BARBER, supra note 276, at 182-86.
284. See RCRA Manual, supra note 37, at 3-4.
285. This does not mean that public participation under RCRA is modeled after
civic republicanism, although many of the concepts and goals identified by EPA
mirror some civic republican ideals.
286. Id. at 2-3.
287. See Poisner, supra note 189, at 62. Advocates of civic republicanism refute
the idea that apathy and ignorance of the public undermines public participation.
See Curtis Ventriss, Emerging Perspectives on Citizen Particpation, 45 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 433, 435 (1985). Instead, civic republicans argue that lack of meaningful
participation creates this ignorance and apathy. See CAROLE PErEMAN,
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citizen competence, opportunities for participation, and
actual participation are related and mutually reinforcing.'
2. Addressing Cultural Differences Through Aspects of
the Deliberative Ideal
Though expanded public participation under RCRA con-
tains some aspects of civic republicanism's deliberative
ideal, the decision-making process cannot be defined as a
deliberative one. Professor Jonathan Poisner developed a
series of criteria for determining whether a participation
program is moving toward or away from deliberation, and
applied these criteria to NEPA. 289 He concluded that NEPA
was far from achieving this ideal.2" It would be unlikely
that RCRA would meet these criteria, particularly because
RCRA requires less participation than does NEPA.29' How-
ever, some of the criteria suggested by the deliberative ideal
seem appropriate for considering how a participation pro-
gram may incorporate views of ethnic minorities. Further,
the expanded public participation rule contains procedures
by which these ideals could be incorporated. Of particular
interest are concepts of dialogue, face-to-face communica-
tion, citizen involvement and community representation. 292
PARrICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIc THEORY (1970).
288. See Daniel J. Forino, Envimmental Risk and Democatic Process: A Crtlcal
Review, 14 COLUM. J. ENvnL. L. 501, 502-03 (1989). See also Poisner, supra note
189, at 62.
289. Professor Poisner developed as criteria the following factors: (1) Does the
citizen participation process encourage dialogue? (2) Does the process focus upon
the common good? (3) Does the process engender critical reflection on the values
underlying the proposal? (4) Does the process inculcate civic virtue? (5) Do par-
ticipants communicate In person, face to face? (6) Does the process involve citi-
zens. as opposed to individuals hired to represent citizens? and (7) Do the partici-
pants represent all significant sectors of the community? Poisner, supra note 189,
at 63.
290. Generally, Poisner found that NEPA continued to incorporate ideals found
in the synoptic and pluralist models, causing NEPA to fall short of the deliberative
ideal. See Id. at 92.
291. See Stephen M. Johnson. NEPA and SEPA's in the Quest for Environmental
Justice, 30 LOY. L.. L. REv. 565 (1997).
292. Admittedly, the omission of concepts of the common good, civic virtue and
engendering critical reflection make this discussion about civic republicanism less
complete, since these are each key concepts. However, the scope of this article is
not concerned with whether RCRA contains a deliberative ideal, but whether the
deliberative ideal may allow better incorporation of ethnic minorities in the deci-
sion-making process.
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a. Dialogue
EPA's policy under RCRA demands a dialogue, rather
than a monologue. 93 This policy is designed to create a flow
of communication between each of the stakeholders in the
process.294  It is concerned with a two-way communication
line, forming the feedback loop the participation should
provide. 95  Practical considerations, such as providing
translators or implementing procedures tailored to a par-
ticular community, especially one predominantly ethnic,
aids the effectiveness of this dialogue.2' Thus, at least
EPA's policy seems to encourage the type of dialogue fa-
vored by the deliberative ideal.
Dialogue under the civic republican deliberative ideal in-
cludes a back and forth communication, requiring flexibility
among participants to respond to each other's points.297
Two key aspects of dialogue make the dialogue deliberative.
First, the dialogue must refine the opinions of the partici-
pants.2' Not only will the opinions of the participants re-
fine other opinions, but allowing the articulation of the
opinion will refine the participant's opinion itself.2 Second,
dialogue becomes deliberative when it requires the partici-
293. See RCRA Manual, supra note 37, at 2-3.
294. See hi
295. See cL
296. EPA encourages understanding and interaction between stakeholders by
following a series of principles. including: (1) Striving to respect other stakeholders
and their opinions; (2) Understanding that people have different levels of under-
standing of RCRA (3) Realizing that decisions made during the permitting process
can have profound economic and social impacts; (4) Acknowledging that statutory
and regulatory requirements limit what can happen during the permitting process;
(5) Recognizing that people have concerns that go beyond the scientific and tech-
nical details of the permitting process: and (6) Understanding the values and in-
terests of other stakeholders before jumping to conclusions. See kL at 2-18.
297. See Poisner, supra note 189, at 64 ("For communication to be dialogue, the
individual or group with the actual decision-making authority for the community
must participation in the communication. Dialogue contrasts with a communica-
tion situation in which either one side does all the speaking, or in which the two
sides are, in effect, speaking past each other toward some other audience.")
298. See hi
299. See RoNALD BEINER, POLmnCAL JuDGMENT 152 (1983) ('[It is mistaken to as-
sume that we necessarily enter into dialogue with an already consolidated view of
where we stand and what we are after, conceiving of speech merely as a means to
be used for winning over others, rather than as an end to be pursued for its own
sake. On the contrary, communication between subjects joined in a community of
rational dialogue may entail a process of moral self-discovery that will lead us to a
better insight into our own ends and a firmer grasp of our own subjectivity.") See
aLso Poisner, supra note 189, at 64.
19991 Multicultural Participation In Public Hearing Process 233
pants to listen °.3  "Listening to the perspective of others,
according to the advocates of deliberation, 'provides dis-
tance, hence perspective, for judging our own opinions and
preferences, assuming that we listen to others with an open
mind.'"
30 1
In an agency proceeding, encouraging dialogue between
the agency and members of an ethnic minority group re-
quires an understanding of the rhetoric of the ethnic mi-
norities.
Rhetoric both is and invites a response... The rhetorical dis-
course advanced in a situation... is someone's response to
that situation. Rhetoric is response- making. Any particular
instance of rhetorical discourse is at the same time response-
inviting. It potentially elicits a response from a member of its
actual audience. This audience may include persons advo-
cating an opposing view. Aware of this response-inviting na-
ture of rhetoric, we often consider the likely responses of our
audience as we compose our rhetorical appeals. Thus, we
coax the imagined audience- a mental conception of our
audience- to respond as we think our actual audience will.30 2
Communication failures often stem from misperceptions
of the parties engaged in the rule-making procedures. Not
only does the procedure itself inhibit effective communica-
tion and dialogue,3 but the inability of agency officials and
members of the public to understand each other's rhetoric
discourse can lead to miscommunication.3 04 This miscom-
munication problem is easily solved, at least in part, if each
300. See L at 65.
301. Id. at 64-65 (quoting Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-
Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Fbundaton of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL.
L. REv. 329 (1994)).
302. JAMES A. HERRICK, THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF RHETORIc 15-16 (1998).
303. The NEPA procedure, which contains much substance of the synoptic and
pluralist models, often fails to encourage dialogue because of the procedure itself.
See Poisner, supra note 189, at 86-87.
304. "Rhetoric refers to a particular kind of discourse, as well as to an art...
The terms 'discourse' refers.., to symbols intentionally organized into a mes-
sage.... In the most general terms, discourse is rhetoric when it is goal-oriented
and seeks, by means of the planned use of symbols, to adapt ideas to an audi-
ence.* HERRicK. supra note 302, at 8 (emphasis omitted from original). Examples
of miscommunication due to the inability of one party's failure to understand the
other's use of expression are seemingly endless. In general terms, if an agency
cannot understand that an ethnic minority will conduct himself or herself in a
manner unlike that of other actors in the process, the ethnic minority cannot be
included properly in the process.
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of the parties enters into the dialogue understanding that
the other party will express views differently due to their
own perceptions of the audience to which they are speak-
ing.305 It is perhaps likely that some members of the com-
munity do not have the experience with speaking in front of
larger groups or in a more formal setting.3" If the agency
expects this difficulty and adjusts the meeting to allow the
speaker to overcome the lack of experience, then the mem-
bers of the community may feel that their inclusion in the
process is more welcomed.
b. Face-to-Face Communication
Deliberation favors actual human contact within the pro-
cess, rather than communication through writing or over
the phone. Although expanded public participation contin-
ues to involve written communications such as application
review0 7 and the submission of written comments to the
agency,3" the RCRA procedure allows citizens to meet face-
305. It is possible that some members of the audience will enter the process
with a confrontational attitude. This may, however, be overcome if the agency
makes it clear that the comments are welcome. This is critical if deliberation is
indeed the ideal. Professor Poisner found NEPA's aspects of synoptism and plu-
ralism caused dialogue in the process to fail. If the public is convinced that the
synoptic format does not count and that the agency will make political decisions
behind closed doors, what use is the hearing process other than to serve as a po-
litical theater? Citizen participants, therefore, routinely use hearing as the setting
for a broader political maneuver. They use it as an opportunity to make their case
not to the EIS agency, nor to the opposing side, but to the broader public through
the lens of the media. However, the media tends to cover the emotional and
heated parts of a hearing, distorting the wider public perspective of the hearing.
Dialogue is decidedly not the result. Poisner, supra note 189, at 87.
306. Initially, the agency must have patience with members of the audience.
The agency must make clear that it welcomes the input provided by members of
the community. If the community member can relax and express viewpoints
naturally, rather than attempting to adapt the formal speaking techniques other
contributors might expect, then the whole process may be the type of back-and-
forth communication urged by the deliberative ideal.
307. The public may educate itself by reviewing the application by the facility.
Although this is designed for education before face-to-face meetings, it may sup-
plement the actual human contact, especially if the agency does not discuss the
application with the members of the public reviewing the application. See RCRA
Manual supru note 37, at 3-17.
308. The exchange of written comments is a concern in the NEPA process, be-
cause this is the most substantive exchange of communication. See Poisner, su-
pm note 189, at 91. This occurs in the NEPA process because of the release of
the environmental impact statements and responses to them by the public. RCRA
does not require EIS statements, so the possibility of face to face interaction
seems more likely.
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to-face with both the applicant and the agency itself. The
pre-application meeting between the public and the facility
is the first of these opportunities. The public also has other
informal opportunities to meet with agency officials
throughout the process to discuss concems.
Face-to-face communication fosters deliberation because
it serves to develop the traits of empathy and respect neces-
sary for deliberation.31 Such communication is essential to
allow effective participation from members of a minority
community. Unless the agency and the facility understand
and empathize with the members of the community, the
communication process cannot be effective and the result
will show in the decisions made. Likewise, actual human
contact allows the communication and the inclusion of the
public to be meaningful "because communication can occur
at many levels simultaneously, with such things as ges-
tures, apparent interest, and facial expressions all signaling
information not transmittable using other modes."" ' This
type of interaction is particularly appropriate when agency
officials are communicating with ethnic minorities. In eve-
ryday, informal communication modes, minorities often use
particular forms of non-verbal language to Illustrate or
supplement verbal language. 3 '2 Although this communica-
tion form is common, some forms of non-verbal communi-
cation may seem foreign to agency officials. More actual
human contact and face-to-face communications allows
agency officials to understand these forms of communica-
tion and enhance the participation process.
c. Citizen Involvement and Community Representation
Civic republicans advocate use of individual, private citi-
zens in the process, rather than use of citizen representa-
tives.1 3 EPA seems to invite inclusion of private citizens
through its various activities during the permitting proc-
309. Activities which may allow these Informal opportunities include workshops
and other informal meetings between the agency and the public. See RCRA Man-
ual. supm note 37. at 3-17.
310. See Poisner, supra note 189, at 67.
311. Id. See also JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYoND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 33-34,
270-272 (1980).
312. See supra note 37.
313. See Poisner, supra note 189, at 67.
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ess 3 1 4 NEPA caused some concern from a civic republican
perspective because the EIS statements released are avail-
able through the Federal Register, which most citizens do
not have the time or interest to skim through on a regular
basis.1 5 Citizen interest is sparked by interest groups that
make the impending EIS statements known.1 6 This does
not seem to be a problem with the RCRA rule. EPA sug-
gests newspaper display advertisements, signs, and broad-
cast media announcements to make the public aware of
impending permit applications.1 7 These and other means
of advertising are particularly appropriate in some minority
communities, where fewer communication outlets may be
available.1 8
Civic republicans also advocate representation from all
significant sectors of the community.3s 9 Deliberation not
only favors diverse representation, it requires it. Modem
civic republicans highly prize political equality. A public
process is more deliberative to the extent it fulfills this ideal
by involving citizens from a diverse set of backgrounds.
However, more than equality of access is needed; citizens
must utilize the access to a reasonable degree. If signifi-
cant sectors of the community do not take part in public
deliberations, the resultant values will not be truly "public
values" in the republican sense. Community will not form.
Indeed, as Professor Paul Brest notes, deliberation "among
people who.., represent a relatively narrow spectrum of
perspectives may create or reinforce a distorted but strongly
held consensus."320 Moreover, the airing of meaningful dis-
agreements, and thus meaningful dialogue, requires diverse
participation. 3
2l
At least in theory, the deliberative ideal seems suited to
incorporate minorities into the decision-making process. In
policy, expanded public participation under RCRA seems
314. EPA expanded its notice requirements to allow as many citizens to find out
about the application of a facility. See RCRA Manual. supra note 37, at 3-9.
315. See Poisner, supra note 189, at 91.
316. See Id&
317. See RCRA Manual, supra note 37, at 3-9 and 3-10.
318. Some modern communication outlets, such as the Internet, may not be
available to poorer communities.
319. See Poisner, supra note 189, at 68.
320. Paul Brest, Constftutional Cittzenship, 34 CLEV. STATE L. REv. 174, 196
(1986).
321. Poisner, supra note 189, at 68.
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able to incorporate these ideals into the rule-making proce-
dures. However, RCRA does retain aspects of expertise and
pluralism in its processes, making advocacy of environ-
mental justice difficult. Moreover, the civic republican ide-
als of civic virtue and the common good may not be appro-
priate to promote environmental justice.
Whether the goal under a participation model is an aggre-
gation of private interests or the achievement of the public
good, environmental justice advocates may face a difficult
to impossible battle.32  Nevertheless, environmental justice
advocacy will continue, and the agencies must develop suc-
cessful procedures to allow into the process environmental
justice advocacy by individuals of diverse ethnic back-
grounds into the process. EPA has made strides to allow
more participation and to make that participation equitable,
but efforts must continue.32
As this article has suggested, meaningful inclusion of mi-
norities in the decision-making process--most likely in-
cluded in advocating environmental justice-may require
the incorporation of several ideals and models. The RCRA
Expanded Public Participation Rule is one of the latest at-
tempts by EPA to allow for meaningful inclusion, particu-
larly because it specifically addresses environmental justice
concerns through several means. Although it has short-
comings, public participation is expanded, both in the
RCRA rule and in other agency proceedings, by recognizing
322. Professor Gauna was particularly skeptical of the civic republican ap-
proach in promoting environmental justice, although she recognizes the "attrac-
tive" qualities of the approach to respond to ethical claims of environmental Jus-
tice advocates. See Gauna, supra note 126, at 47. One notable concern was that
profit motives and economic incentive could be considered- not unlike the utili-
tarian concept of happiness- a common good. See id. at 48-49. If industrial in-
terests become the common good, then the civic republican model becomes as un-
able to achieve environmental justice as the more traditional models of
participation.
323. As with pluralism, if the economic cost of achieving environmental justice
will outweigh its benefit, it is difficult to image either a public or private prefer-
ence, beyond the ethical claims of environmental justice advocates, which could
achieve such a goal.
324. The goals of participation of ethnic minorities and advocacy of environ-
mental justice, although interrelated in many respects, are not the same. A pos-
sible concern is that the inclusion of minorities in the process, without a change
in the injustices served through placement of hazardous waste sites, may be
somewhat of a "mask" over the problem of environmental justice advocacy. This is
true even if inclusion of minorities is deemed meaningful. Strengthening the
community's voice is the subject of the final section, infra.
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the problems that exclusion creates. Agencies may also
take into account new methods to adopt both within the
EPA and outside the environmental arena.
V. SOME SUGGESTED ANALEPTICS
3 25
A. Citizen Advisory Groups as a Means to Encourage
Meaningful Participation
Effective inclusion of minority groups in the rule-making
process may depend less on the theoretical models dis-
cussed above and more on the actual procedures involved
within the process. One of the means by which EPA strives
to promote environmental justice is the formation of a Citi-
zen Advisory Group ("CAG"), which EPA recognizes can pro-
vide meaningful participation and empowerment for the af-
fected community.326 EPA, in the RCRA Public Participation
Manual, describes the CAG's activity and its strengths and
weaknesses. 32' A CAG generally allows a community to se-
lect representatives of diverse community interests to pres-
ent and discuss the needs and concerns of the community
with the government and the facility.32"The CAG is usually
composed of a board of stakeholders who meet to discuss
issues involving a facility, with the purpose of advising a fa-
cility operator or the agency on permitting or corrective ac-
tion activities.329 An important strength in the promotion of
environmental justice advocacy and effective inclusion of
minority interests is the promotion of a direct, two-way
communication between the agency, facility and the com-
munity.33
0
325. Although the term *analeptics" generally refers to restoration, I use the
term here similarly to the use of the term in medical practice. As used here, these
suggested "analeptics" seek to restore minorities and other disadvantaged groups
to the position where they should be in the administrative process.
326. See RCRA Manual, supra note 37, at 2-20.
327. See fd.
328. See id.
329. See Id.
330. See id. EPA recognizes that the use of a CAG is limited. The RCRA Public
Participation Manual lists the following as factors to consider before forming one:
(1) The level of community interest and concern; (2) community interest in forming
a CAG; (3) the existence of groups with competing agendas in the community; (4)
environmental justice issues or concerns regarding the facility;, (5) the history of
involvement with the facility, or with environmental issues in general; and (6) the
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The formation of a CAG is, in part, designed to supple-
ment the sometimes limited capacity of the agency to take
into consideration public input under the review and com-
ment procedures." It also contains aspects of negotiated
rule-making, an alternative to the traditional review-and-
comment procedures." The use of a CAG confronts the
limitations found in the review-and-comment procedures
and the negotiated rule-making, including inclusiveness,
openness, procedural fairness, and dialogue.' It is par-
ticularly appropriate for environmental justice advocates,
since "membership is not characterized by representation of
an organized group, but by the more generalized idea of an
identifiable interest that contributes to achieving a broad
range of potentially affected interests."33  Members of mi-
nority groups or others who are not generally included
within the decision-making process may be included, or at
least represented, at meetings involving the agency and the
facility. Technical issues, which hamper effective commu-
nication under the various forms of participation,335 are dis-
cussed in detail with the CAG's, bringing the participants
"up to speed" on the key issues.336 It gives citizens the op-
portunity to understand the technical issues, which in turn
allows the citizens to analyze issues critically and make in-
working relationship between the facility, the community, and the permitting
agency. See id. at 5-142 and 5-143.
331. See Applegate, supra note 7, at 921-926.
332. Regulatory negotiation ('reg-neg" or "negotiated rulemaking") appeared as
an alternative approach in the early 1980s. See Philip J. Harter, Negotiated
Regulations: A Cure for the Mallase, 71 GEo. L.J. 1 (1982). The conceptual frame-
work of the reg-neg makes it possible to bring together representatives of an
agency and the various interest groups to negotiate a proposed rule. See DAVID M.
PRIZKER & DEBORAH S. DALToN, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK 1 (Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States ed.. 1995). However, for all the success
from the use of the reg-neg, it has its drawbacks (which is the reason it is not ex-
amined more closely in this article). It favors a clear agency relationship between
each of the parties, not possible with private citizens. It also favors well-organized
interests, which would be possible through the use of citizen's advisory boards or
advisory groups, discussed here.
333. See Applegate, supra note 7. at 921.
334. Id. at 922. See also ROBERT E. HowELL ET Ai., DESIGNING A CnZEN
INVOLVEMENT PROGRAM 1- 2 (1987).
335. The limitations caused by technical issues in the review and comment are
discussed in section I. Technical issues may also hamper negotiated rulemaking,
because the reg-neg limits the inclusion of the participants to "regular players,"
who have a firm understanding of the technical issues.
336. See Applegate, supm note 7. at 922-23.
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formed decisions about the issues affecting them." 7 Fur-
ther, the CAG's build trust between the community, the
agency, and the facility in the process.33' "EPA recognizes
that the use of CAG is time-consuming and resource-
intensive."339
CAGs that do not accurately reflect or account for public con-
cerns may lose support in the community. In addition, un-
certainty about the group's charter may cause conflict and
hard feelings. If [an agency plans] to use a CAG, the mission
and responsibilities of the CAG must be made clear from the
start. Finally, CAGs can spend so much time agreeing on
procedures that they drive away people who are concerned
with substance. The need for elaborate procedures can be
sharply reduced if an advisory group agrees to work on a con-
sensus basis rather than by majority vote.34
[However, tihe alternative is to ignore public perceptions and
concerns, spending at least equivalent resources later in de-
fending decisions already made against public opposition. If
citizens are informed and involved from the outset, it is much
more difficult for politicians to mobilize them, using their ig-
norance to turn inchoate concerns about powerlessness into
opposition to a project that might have an acceptable benefit-
risk ratio. Moreover, citizens for whom the issue is salient
have time to master the subject; the more knowledgeable
people become, the more likely they are to understand and
accept many portions of technical risk analyses. They can
become emissaries to their communities.34'
Use of CAGs in the environmental justice movement or in
the move for successful inclusion of minority groups is
337. See Id.
338. See id. at 924 (*Citizen advisory boards are ultimately about building trust
among the participants, whether the divide is government-citizen, technician-
layperson, or industrialist-environmentalist This in turn demands much of all
the participants. Substantively, the decision-maker (sponsor) must accept and
support the existence of such a group and be willing to accept its recommenda-
tions. The corollary is that the decision has not already been made, so that the
final decision is truly collaborative.")
339. See RCRA Manual, supra note 37, at 5-142.
340. See id. at 5-142. With respect to Superfund sites, EPA provides Guidance
for Community Advisory Groups at Superfund Sites, December 1995. Although
CAGs in Superfund sites and under the RCRA program will differ, this guide dis-
cusses how to set up a CAG. RCRA regulations do not require the use of CAGs,
but 40 C.F.R. § 25.7 provides standards should an agency decide to form a CAG.
341. Susan G. Hadden, Public Perceptions of Hazardous Waste. 11 RISK ANALYSIS
47, 54 (1991). See also Applegate, supra note 7, at 925.
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merely a suggestion. Like all other participation models, it
has its drawbacks, particularly to individual members of a
community. It is indeed a powerful tool to allow citizens to
voice concerns, but it may at the same time limit the ability
of each member of the community to voice his or her own
concern. In a sense, the whole discussion is then back to
square one. Nevertheless, it is an avenue that may allow
the concerns to be voiced as a collective, which is a stronger
voice than the minority groups have at present.
B. Implementation of the Model Plan for Public
Participation and NEJAC
The National Environmental Justice Advisory Council
("NEJAC") is a federal advisory committee that was estab-
lished by charter in 1993 to provide independent advice,
consultation, and recommendations to the Administrator of
EPA on matters related to environmental justice. The
NEJAC is made up of 25 members, and one designated fed-
eral office ("DFO"), who serve on a parent council that has
six subcommittees. 32 NEJAC helps develop recommenda-
tions for methods by which the EPA can institutionalize
public participation in its environmental programs.3" In
1994, the Public Participation and Accountability Subcom-
mittee of NEJAC developed the Model Plan for Public Par-
ticipation.' One of the guiding principles of the Model Plan
is the encouragement of public participation in all aspects
of environmental decision-making utilizing "cross-cultural
formats and exchanges. " "
The Model Plan includes an Environmental Justice Public
Participation Checklist for Government Agencies, which
lists some of the tasks that agencies should use to increase
participation. These include: (1) identifying key individuals
who can represent various stakeholder interest; (2) learning
as much as possible about stakeholders and their concerns
342. NEJAC Public Participation and Accountability Subcommittee, United
States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Environmental Justice Model
Plan for Public Participation, http://www.prcemi.com.80inejac/publicat.html
(last modified Dec. 4. 1997) (hereinafter Model Pic).
343. For example, EPA's Office of Environmental Justice was created following a
NEJAC recommendation.
344. Model Plan, supm note 342.
345. Id. at 2, 6-9.
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through personal consultation; (3) telephone and written
contacts; (4) ensuring that information-gathering tech-
niques include modifications for minority and low-income
communities (for example, consider language and cultural
barriers, technical background, literacy, access to respon-
dents, privacy issues, and preferred types of communica-
tions); (5) soliciting stakeholder involvement early in the
policy-making process, beginning in the planning and de-
velopment stages and continuing through implementation
and oversight; (6) promoting diversity in the workplace; (7)
providing agency staff who are trained in cultural, linguistic
and community outreach techniques; (8) using, as appro-
priate, historically Black Colleges and Universities ("HBCU")
and Indian Centers to network and form community links
that they can provide; and (9) and providing an "open mi-
crophone" format during meetings to allow community
members to ask questions and identify issues from the
community.'
In addition to adopting the Model Plan, administrative
agencies could tackle the problem of poor multi-cultural
participation by establishing a formal office responsible for
such issues within the agency. Public agencies might also
consider assigning a "cultural liaison" to administrative
rule-making proceedings. These individuals would be re-
sponsible for ensuring that the administrative agency fol-
lows the Model Plan and correctly implements the recom-
mendations.
C. Community-Based Mobilization
Individuals and multi-cultural advocates can assist in in-
creasing multi-cultural participation in the rule-making
process. Professor Luke W. Cole has proposed a model that
can be used to help increase public participation in com-
munities where participation may be poor.34 7 Professor Cole
first describes the traditional approach taken by legal envi-
ronmental advocates:
In the traditional model of environmental advocacy, the law-
346. Id.
347. Luke W. Cole, Empowennent as the Key to Environmental Protectfon: The
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECoLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992).
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yer reads and analyzes the EIR document, shares parts of it
with selected experts, and then writes extensive, technical
comments on the EIR on behalf of a client group. These
comments are submitted to the agency and form the basis of
later lawsuits if the agency does not respond adequately.34
Professor Cole then argues that for more effective partici-
pation, lawyers should shift from this traditional legal role
into that of community activist, performing what he calls
"lawyering for social change:"
The lawyer attempts to involve and educate the community
while addressing the root of the problem: that the... [gov-
ernment] ... is ignoring and dismissing the needs of ... [the]
residents without fear of repercussions because the residents
are not organized.
349
Using this model, the lawyer begins a grassroots effort to
involve as many people of the community as possible. This
would begin with a series of house meetings in the city.
Community leaders, instead of lawyers, would explain the
proposal. The lawyer would help describe some of the de-
tails of the process and answer questions. Each participant
would be asked to write a letter of comment on the pro-
posal. People could share their stories and/or fears with
each other. This would help bring the community together
to learn about the issue and help encourage action.
D. Watchdog Agencies
The Legislature might wish to set up a separate agency
designed to do one thing: keep eyes on the administrative
rule-making process. 3' Unfortunately, efforts to form such
348. I& at 675.
349. Id.
350. A possibility for giving the poor a voice in state rule-making is to create a
People's Council' in each state, modeled after the recommendations of the Admin-
istrative Conference of the United States for a Federal People's Counsel. These
state people's counsel could assist of an individual or organization whose prime
responsibility would be to represent the collective interest of the poor as a class in
all state and local administrative rule-making substantially affecting the poor.
The state people's counsel would also be charged with assuring that the views of
'significant separable minority interest' among the poor are represented in state
rule-making and with disseminating to all poor people's organizations pertinent
information concerning rule-making. The people's counsel could be created by the
state as a quasi-public, private corporation modeled after the Corporation for
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agencies have failed. Since 1965, numerous bills intro-
duced in Congress sought to establish a new federal agency
to represent the interests of America's consumers in regu-
latory and adjudicatory proceedings."' None have passed.
Another means of performing the work of a watchdog
agency is to provide funding to existing community groups
so that they can afford to participate. "Some laws include
provisions for technical assistance grants to local groups to
help them better take part in the process." 2 While this
does not solve cultural difference problems associated with
public hearings, it does increase participation and the like-
lihood that those involved will demand greater respect for
their cultural differences.
E. Litigation
Two types of legal remedies exist that advocates for multi-
cultural participation might pursue. They generally offer
little hope of relief, however, either because the available
remedies are limited, or because the burden of proof is too
high.
1. Constitutional Claims- Equal Protection
Equal protection remedies are available at the federal
level pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,3"
and in many states under their own constitutions.3
"Equality jurisprudence at the federal level is restricted by
Washington v. Davis.... [In this case], the United States
Public Broadcasting, or funded independently as a pilot project by a university
through its law schools or school of public administration or a private foundation
or all three. Ashman, supra note 140.
351. See HR 7179, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965). S. 607, 860, 2045, 3097, 3165,
3240, 9th Cong., Ist Sess. (1969). HR 18214, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970); S. 4459,
91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970); HR 14, 15, 16, 254, 1015, 3809, 4429, 4430, 4431,
4432, 4433, 4434, 4541, 4588, 5449, 5948, 6369. 7385. 10835, 92nd Cong., Ist
Sess. (1971); S. 1177, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 3890, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess.
(1972); S. 707, 1160. 93rd Cong. 1st Sess. (1973); HR 13163, 13456, 93rd Cong.
2d Sess. (1974); HR 7575, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 200, 94th Cong.. Ist
Sess. (1975); HR 6805, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); S. 1262, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977).
352. Luke W. Cole. Legal Services, Public Participaon, and Environmental Jus-
tice. 29 CLEARNGHOUSE REviEw 449, 450-51 n. 4 (1995).
353. For an analytical summary of federal equal protection jurisprudence, see
LAWRENcE H. TRIBE, AMEmCAN CoNsmn ONAL LAw, 16-1 to 16-58 (2d. ed. 1988).
354. See Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitufnal Law, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1985).
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Supreme Court required discriminatory intent to trigger
strict scrutiny of a facially race-neutral governmental ac-
tion. "35 Strict scrutiny, the most exacting standard of equal
protection review, is triggered when the government action
burdens a suspect class, such as a racial minority, or in-
terferes with a fundamental right. 3"" To withstand strict
scrutiny, government action must be narrowly tailored and
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.
3 57
Intent can be proven from circumstantial evidence as well
as from direct evidence.3 In Village of Arlington Heights,
the Supreme Court set out the following five categories of
circumstantial evidence from which the discriminatory mo-
tive may be inferred: (1) an official action's effect on a par-
ticular race; (2) the decision's historical background; (3) the
sequence of events immediately preceding the action; (4)
any departures, substantive or procedural, from the ordi-
nary decision-making process; and (5) the action's legisla-
tive or administrative history.35
Under these standards, it is difficult for individuals to
raise equal protection challenges to administrative agency
actions. Individuals who have been merely left out of the
process through communication barriers will not be able to
show enough evidence to prove disproportionate negative
impacts from this neglect, let alone intent.
2. Civil Rights Statutes- Title VI
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, color or national origin in pro-
grams or activities receiving federal financial assistance.3c°
Individuals seeking relief under this statute usually have a
very high burden of proof required of them. This is because
discrimination can only be proved by showing that the
agency had intent to discriminate.3 6' However, "[u]nder EPA
355. Peter L Reich. Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Dis-
crimination, 41 KAN L. REv. 272, 290 (1992).
356. TRIBE, supra note 353, at 57.
357. Id
358. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
359. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252. 266-
268.
360. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1998).
361. See Washington, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding disproportionate black fail-
ure rate on police test not an equal protection violation in absence of discrimina-
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regulations, Title VI bars disproportionate impact in the
administration of environmental programs, including siting
and enforcement, thus skirting the formidable barrier to
challenging inequality created by the requirements of
Washington v. Davis... and Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp.... that an equal protection
claim be supported by a showing of discriminatory intent,
as opposed to discriminatory effect..362
Lawsuits under Tritle VI are, by definition, limited to suits
against federal or state agencies that receive federal fund-
ing. Moreover, this type of suit requires the claimant to
prove discrimination. In the context of cultural differences
during public comment periods of the rule-making process,
it is extremely unlikely that a court would determine that
discrimination has occurred. Indeed, there are no recorded
cases that have directly addressed the issue of Title VI vio-
lations with respect to public hearings. The efforts made in
civil rights litigation in the past, and the statistics sur-
rounding environmental impacts on minorities are probably
indicative of the difficulty in making such a claim.
F. Legislation
One possible alternative to constitutional equal protection
is a new federal statute specifically prohibiting racial, cul-
tural, or linguistic discrimination in the process of receiving
public comments. Such legislation could be patterned after
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which imposes an ef-
fects test for determining the existence of employment dis-
crimination 3  Moving such comprehensive and necessarily
controversial civil rights legislation through Congress, how-
ever, may present a major political obstacle. Ideological
and regional alignments nearly derailed the 1964 Civil
Rights Act numerous times!" Given its history, a race dis-
tory intent): and Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding that
certain categories of circumstantial evidence can show discriminatory motives).
362. Luke W. Cole, Community-Based Admnlnistrative Advocacy Under Civil
Rights Law: A PbtentLal Environmental Justice Tool for Legal Services Advocates, 29
CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 360, 361 (1995).
363. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to 2000d-17 (1994). See also MACK A. PLAYER,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW., 5.41 (1988) (Analyzing disparate impact Juris-
prudence).
364. See generally. CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISlATnvE HISTORY OF THE 1964 C-m IGHTS ACr (1985).
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crimination or cultural discrimination bill explicitly incor-
porating disparate impact during public hearings would
probably face substantial opposition in Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
Failure to address multi-cultural differences in adminis-
trative rule-making and the public hearing process in the
environmental arena has led to far more than a resentment
of being "left out" of the process; it has led to minority and
poor communities bearing a disproportionately high per-
centage of environmental risk. As this article has argued,
correcting such disparity of inclusion will necessarily re-
quire active attempts to include these community members
in the decision-making process. Such inclusion will require
creative thinking and sensitivity to multi-cultural issues on
the part of the rule-making agencies.
Although no agency should be held to the standard of
providing perfect forums for communication, some accom-
modations can and should be made for groups that have
traditionally been kept out of the process. Agencies should
assess the demographic and cultural makeup of a commu-
nity that may be affected when proposing rules, and iden-
tify which cultural groups may be under-represented if the
agency were to use its traditional tools for communication.
Efforts should then be made to tailor agency outreach to
that community, including providing not only the option for
discussion through interpreters, but also forums that are
more familiar and less intimidating than a traditional pub-
lic hearing.
The result of efforts by EPA to include a broader range of
participants in the RCRA permitting process remains to be
seen. EPA's policy statements echo the environmental jus-
tice advocate's, but legitimate concern also remains as to
whether an EPA hearing process can incorporate a deon-
tological approach, moving away from its utilitarian ap-
proach.3' The ability of an agency to balance the good of
the collective whole with the individual rights of those af-
fected by an administrative decision directly correlates to
365. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only From a Na-
tional Perspective) For Federal Environmental Law, 7 DUKE ENVY'L L. & POLy F.
225, 304(1997).
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the ability of the agency to incorporate the viewpoints of
those affected by the decision. 366 The inability to do so,
coupled with the recognition that wealth maximization is a
legitimate preference in administrative decision-making, not
only leads to learned helplessness and frustration with the
process by the people most affected by the decision, but
also allows a theoretical justification for excluding these
people's ideas from the decision-making process.36 Ethnic
minorities then face a battle on two fronts: first, the agency
excludes minorities because it is not capable of addressing
multicultural concerns in its hearing process; and second,
even when the minorities are included, their ideas are not
incorporated because the agency is incapable of juxtaposing
the minorities' ideals with those of the agency and other
participants. Justice will only occur when all barriers to
participation are broken, even if it requires a dramatic dis-
placement of the theoretical purpose behind administrative
action in the rule-making process.
366. See Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantita-
tive Risk Assessment 1996 U. ILL L. REV. 103 (1996).
367. Ronald Dworkin questions the concept of wealth maximization as a societal
preference as it is incorporated into the economic theory of law. See RONALD
DWORKIN, A MATrR oF PRNiCIPLE 237 (1985). While he discusses wealth maximi-
zation in part to reject the economic theory of law (particularly Judge Posner's),
the concept of wealth maximization, discussed supra notes 254-257 and accom-
panied text, wealth maximization is also a societal preference which hinders the
ability to incorporate environmental justice concerns in models of utilitarianism
and civic republicanism.
